

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

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## THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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# Khrushchev: A Political Profile

## IV

By WILLIAM K. MEDLIN

THE patronage powers that derived from the post of Party secretary were skillfully used at all levels by Khrushchev over twenty-five years, gradually building up a group of loyal supporters dedicated to his brand of leadership. By the time of the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956, this group had developed into an impressive and vocal faction within the Communist Party. With this force and through his own political artistry, Khrushchev sought to gain specific advantages in major policy issues that faced the Soviet Union's collective leadership after Stalin. Some examples to which Khrushchevian techniques were applied are particularly illustrative of his maneuvers that helped to bring him to the summit.

*Impact on Society.* Upon being appointed formally chief administrator (First Secretary) of the Central Committee in September, 1953, Khrushchev launched into a general and severe criticism of Soviet agricultural policies and urged ambitious schemes for expansion (more extensive than intensive) during the years ahead.<sup>1</sup> This move condemned agricultural policies under Stalin and was a direct strike against G. M. Malenkov, who in 1949 had announced that Soviet production of grain was no longer a problem.<sup>2</sup> The move at the same time attracted peasant interest in and possible support for Khrushchev's measures. His personal sponsorship of agricultural reorganization revealed that he also took fundamental issue with the Malenkov government's consumer-goods policy, since expansion in agriculture was closely linked to heavy industrial

<sup>1</sup>*Pravda*, September 13, 1953.

<sup>2</sup>*Pravda*, November 7, 1949.

production. As if to bolster his heavy industry posture — and therefore improve his relationships with industrial managers — Khrushchev became belligerent on international questions in 1954, especially on East-West relations (e.g., see his April 1954 address before the Supreme Soviet). Heavy defense industry was alerted. He clearly implied that it was no time for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a “soft” internal policy in favor of the consumer. It may be recalled that the polemics in the Soviet press on the question of heavy-light industry emphasis ended in a firm reindorsement of the “Leninist” policy of giving priority to heavy industry. Malenkov’s leadership had been challenged and put on the defensive. In February, 1955, Malenkov confessed before the Soviet people and the world to having committed serious policy errors, especially in agriculture, and announced his unfitness for the post of premier. Khrushchev nominated and obtained Bulganin as the new head of Government.

All during 1953-54, Nikita Khrushchev, in very un-Stalin-like fashion but in his own characteristic way, traveled about the country mending his political fences, damaging those of others, and generally raising the Party’s prestige and level of activities, which had been low in Stalin’s last years of police rule. In November, 1953, one of his tactical maneuvers took him to Leningrad where he personally supervised the firing of V. M. Andrianov, Party head there after the Zhdanov period and an old Malenkov associate. Frol Kozlov (currently Khrushchev’s first deputy premier) took Andrianov’s place.<sup>3</sup> Similar changes occurred in other important regions. The three key posts, Moscow, Ukraine, and Leningrad, as well as a number of others, after 1953 fell into the hands of Khrushchev’s friends.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>*Pravda*, November 29, 1953; cf. *The Russian Review*, April, 1959, p. 142 esp. footnote 48.

<sup>4</sup>Respectively Kapitonov-Furtseva, Kirichenko, and Kozlov. The importance of the big three fell off at the nineteenth party Congress to 29% (compared to 40% in 1939), and to 23% at the XX Congress. But in 1956 Khrushchev had old associates at the head of other important organizations as well: Brezhnev in Kazakhstan (having transferred from Ukraine), with 50 delegates; Mzhavanadze in Georgia, with 38 delegates, and others. *Pravda*, October 9, 1952; XX S’ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 14-25 fevralia 1956 g., *Stenograficheski otchet*, Moskva, 1956, vol I, pp. 233 ff.

During 1954-56 he traveled abroad extensively and personally met Tito, Nehru, Mao Tse-tung, U Nu, Eden, and Queen Elizabeth II. He became the most widely traveled Russian leader since Lenin, and under such different auspices! He has not concealed his sincere desire to practice his folksy charms in the United States, which has already had a pictorial glimpse of the leader over television. Popular in his own country and known in many areas of the world through his tireless personal contacts, Khrushchev is listened to by vast audiences unknown to Stalin.

After his 1953 rise to Party leadership, Khrushchev espoused a series of new measures in economic, social, and cultural affairs which were popularly received by various sections of the Soviet public. Some of the more noticeable examples of liberality were his call for higher prices for agricultural products — a boon to peasant life; granting peasants the right to retain for personal use the entire produce derived from their private plots; an increase in old age benefits; denunciation of the brutal aspects of Stalin's rule and the rehabilitation of scores of citizens persecuted under Stalin; revision and improvement of police administration and judicial procedures, bringing greater respect for individual integrity; revision of Soviet Marxist theory, whereby several paths (including parliamentary evolution) toward a Communist society are recognized as possible; liquidation of the Machine-Tractor Station system (a socio-economic control device of the State) and the transfer to collective farms of agricultural machines; redressing Party practices abusing religious societies; expansion of housing construction; decentralization of administrative controls whereby local authorities enjoy considerable leeway in finding solutions to immediate problems; and still other measures. These acts have all occurred in the post-Stalin era and have, in varying degrees, been connected with Khrushchev's calculated rise to power. While a number of them bore his personal imprint, others issued from collective demand for change. Some Khrushchev ideas may not have evoked enthusiasm among certain strata of society, especially entrenched bureaucratic groups dating from Stalin days. Furthermore, his liberal policies unleashed trends and forces at home and in satel-

lite countries that brought forth firm — sometimes brutal (as in Hungary) — counter measures by the Khrushchev-Bulganin Government to preserve the regime.

In many policy statements, travels abroad, and receptions in Moscow for foreign dignitaries, Mr. Khrushchev deliberately eclipsed Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and in effect became his own minister for foreign affairs. He concerned himself with major policy matters of other cabinet posts as well; military affairs, where he apparently disagreed with Marshal Zhukov over the relationship between ground and air forces, finally dismissing the Marshal; culture and education, fields in which Khrushchev made major policy pronouncements during 1957-58 pertaining to literary license and education reforms; economic planning, whereby the five-year plan was revised into a seven-year plan (1959-65) which will terminate during Khrushchev's seventy-first year; and agriculture, where through land reclamation and crop diversification, especially in grains, Soviet farming patterns received the most radical alterations since forced collectivization in the early 1930's. His personal implementation of these measures made Khrushchev, at various times, *ex officio* minister in their respective areas. There are few ministries in the Government today that have not felt the direct hand of the Premier in their daily affairs.

Khrushchev's policy maneuvers and alterations provided him not only with substantial popularity but also with opportunities to introduce new personnel into the vast Soviet bureaucratic system. By the time the Twentieth Party Congress met, Soviet information media left little doubt as to his pre-eminent place in the Soviet ruling group. At that Congress he gave the Report of the Central Committee (Malenkov had done so in 1952); he delivered the major denunciation of the Stalin personality cult and of Stalin's criminal and blundering acts; and he brought many of his supporters into the top ruling group.<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev's primacy in the Party hierarchy was no longer a question, it was a demonstrated political fact. Thereafter it took less than two

<sup>5</sup>While the full membership of the Presidium (Politburo) remained the same as before the Congress, the *new* candidates to that body and the *new* Secretaries of the Central Committee were mostly close associates of the First Secretary.

years to have the Central Committee dismiss leading members of the highest organ, the Party Presidium, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Shepilov, Zhukov, and, later, Bulganin,<sup>6</sup> and to replace them with persons who had ties with or had served under Khrushchev, namely, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Kozlov, Kirichenko, Kirilenko, Korotchenko, Mzhvanadze, Podgorny, and Polyanski. Thus, a substantial number from the political slate of candidates in 1956 were moved into full membership in subsequent months; and to take their old places, in turn, other Khrushchev supporters were brought up into the "anti-chamber" of power. The next most conspicuous change has been the almost complete displacement, except for Mikoyan and Kosygin, of veteran economic administrators from the Presidium. Without exception, those dismissed have been replaced by career Party managers rather than by experienced economic or financial specialists.<sup>7</sup>

The political phenomenon of Party careerists dominating the ruling group under Khrushchev's chairmanship represents a new phase in the development of Soviet government and society. He is leader and spokesman for a new, younger set of the political elite. Since moving into power they have initiated changes and reforms which go further, and are more ambitious, than those pushed by Khrushchev during the years 1953-56. One wonders what will be the response of society to the various programs which now demand ever more effort and personal deprivations from society; and how will its task-masters respond to society's strains? Solutions devised by Soviet politics will determine whether Khrushchev's monopoly of power will revert to the dark periods of Stalin's rule or not. Assuming we have a true picture of the Khrushchev personality, there is cause

<sup>6</sup>The roles of Marshal Zhukov and the military hierarchy, especially during Khrushchev's rapid ascent, are key problems requiring clarification for a full understanding of this Byzantine-like episode. The military crisis created in the Middle East and over-dramatized by Khrushchev in the fall of 1957, for example, terminated upon the ouster of Zhukov from Party and Government posts.

<sup>7</sup>Bulganin, Kaganovich, Perukhin, Saburov, and, in later years Malenkov, all held major responsibilities for economic programs. While "Marshal" Bulganin held military posts for a number of years, his training and experience were chiefly in economic administration.



for some hope; but that personality will not always be at the Russian helm.

*Personality and Family.* The Soviet Premier is not intimately nor even well known to anyone outside his own circle of relatives and friends. For this reason, a truly candid description of the man is impossible to trace here. It is nonetheless worthwhile to study those aspects that emerge from the more informative, personal encounters.<sup>8</sup> While his roundish (5' 5", 200-pound) physique, bull neck, and bald pate are not particularly attractive and strike a plebian appearance. He has a quick, alert mind that pounces eagerly upon any advantage dropped in verbal exchanges. This alertness serves him especially well in the art of repartee, at which he shows great skill. He loves an argument, and after even eight hours of it can still beam with zest. Change of pace to catch his opponent off balance is a technique he employs cleverly. While in the main more clumsy than polished, he can be fair, courteous, and logical in debate. Contrariwise, he can be abusive to those not present, vain, and deceitful if it suits his purpose. He exhibits a sense of humor — a hearty feeling for the human drama and the trials of everyday folk. By using an old Russian literary device, the proverb, he embroiders his speeches and coins quips with the aim of pointing to life's lessons and to morals he seeks to inculcate.

Some of his uses of this technique are revealing. When reminded of the high standard of material living in the United States Khrushchev retorted: "Every snipe boasts about his own swamp!" On another, similar occasion, referring to Russian priorities, he said, "Better fill a man's stomach than his eyes." Speaking to agricultural managers about the huge program cut

<sup>8</sup>I am indebted to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who spent eight and one-half hours with Khrushchev in December 1958; Mr. Marshall MacDuffie, former UNRRA Representative in the USSR, who saw Khrushchev many times (1946, 1953, and 1955); Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who has met at length with Khrushchev and members of his family; and Mr. James Reston, of the *New York Times*, who interviewed the Russian leader. I have used, N. S. Khrushchev, *Verbatim Reports of Two Interviews Granted to American Newspapermen* (London, 1957); *Soviet Affairs Notes*, No. 215, 1957; and Paul Reynaud in *Le Figaro*, August 8, 1958.

out for them, Khrushchev put it bluntly, "We must pull our socks up and churn out more butter." He admonished, "You must believe in corn as you believe in clover." Needling the collective farmer to recognize the possibilities of new agricultural policies, he said, "corn is . . . sausage on the handle — it's beefsteak and bacon." To suggestions that political troubles in the U.S.S.R. leadership group would follow dismissals of high officials like Marshal Zhukov, Khrushchev quipped, "A hungry man dreams of buns." Albeit inconclusively, one can surmise that this side of his personality connotes a kind of basic reasonableness about human affairs and a respect for human nature. Garrulous and extroverted, Khrushchev is always ready to communicate and discuss. These habits illustrate peasant background and long association with peasant and working people. Somewhat like the European peasant attracted to and won over by the town, Khrushchev is curious about new gadgets and anxious to innovate or alter. Although he had not yet assumed a Government position in 1955, he sent one of his old Ukrainian associates, V. V. Matskevich, to the United States to study farm management for whatever advantages it might have for the Soviets. Some changes ensued which can in part be traced to American influence.

Khrushchev likes to meet people, and urges everyone to "live it up." Once while motoring in Yugoslavia he wrestled Mikoyan in a field by the side of the road; recently he rowed U. N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in a boat for two hours on the Black Sea; and at a Kremlin party he more than played the "gay blade" by waltzing ladies around the floor, soloing forth with old folk songs, and liberally jesting about with the crowd. Khrushchev has little taste or patience for the "egg-head" or stuffed-shirt intellectual, but yet wastes no time in praising Soviet scientists for their achievements.

Khrushchev's origin, education, training, and experience have not made him tolerant of others' views, except when there is special advantage to him. He became tolerant of Tito in 1955-56 when he thought that the Yugoslav leader, a popular hero in Russia, could be brought back into the Soviet politico-military fold. He has shown dogged determination to vindicate his con-

victions, and has on occasion been so enthusiastic about his ideas that he failed of capacity to express them coherently. A peasant-worker raised to supreme power, he is exuberant, overconfident, and self assertive. These qualities are dangerous in the absence of constitutional controls. Like many politicians the world over, he is frequently caught in contradictions. To cite but one of many examples, in one breath he insists that in relations with "capitalist" countries "we (the Soviets) want to compete in housing construction, food, and services to the people." But in another breath, he boastfully proclaims to the world that Russia is leading the world in the missiles race for military supremacy. Khrushchev is not doctrinaire as far as "Marxism-Leninism" is concerned: he is a pragmatist, a shifter, an opportunist, an eclectic.

He has announced revisions of traditional Soviet Marxist doctrine on such questions as international war, class revolution (as the only road to Communism), the role of leaders in socialist society, etc. He quotes Lenin to suit his own purpose and will tell collective farmers that his grandmother knew more about cabbage growing than the farm brigades with all their mechanical equipment, without a thought for "scientific socialism." Khrushchev even evinces a strain of bourgeois mentality when he says that opportunities and rewards for bright young men in present-day Russia are about the same in all the leading professional fields: it doesn't make much difference whether one chooses engineering, the armed forces or academic life, since the opportunities for advancement and financial benefits are about the same for all — for all those favored with the proper qualifications, one may add.

Khrushchev has pointed to his Christian upbringing at home, while adding that he turned to atheism. On many occasions, however, he has referred to God in ways not disrespectful of Deity, yet not reverently either. Referring to a Christmas message of President Eisenhower, Khrushchev said, "God knows that we have not counted their (the American's) money," apparently implying that invocations to protect the free world's culture from the revolution are not necessary in these times. He once told Russian youth that wavering between belief and dis-



belief in God was foolish. On another occasion he advised people to "have the fear of God" when considering the uses of nuclear weapons. He is familiar with the Bible and can recite its moral stories.

What emerges from our knowledge of Nikita S. Khrushchev is a man of much native ability, alert and shrewd, who will not be easily fooled and can be tough. It is a man who seems to know the pulse of the people, because he understands them, having long lived among them and keeps in touch with them. This is a man who is less concerned with the philosophical formulations of things than he is with finding ways to solve immediate problems in order to enhance the power and efficiency of a newly industrialized society and to increase the political hold which he and his faction have in the regime. He is an adroit politician who knows the political elements at his control and how to maneuver himself and his partisans into greater power. Khrushchev is impetuous, anxious, and eager to forge ahead on ambitious plans. He is more confident than cautious. He is an organizer and builder of industrial and agricultural developments whose scope may transform Russian Eurasia in another generation.

Khrushchev has not yet proved himself a statesman; he is too mundane, too practical for that. In terms of personal experience and understanding, he is relatively ignorant of the outside world, of the cultural, social, and economic ideas that have motivated other societies for centuries. He owes this ignorance in great part to his origin from the great mass of Russians who lived in isolation from other European cultures, and to their almost complete lack of social mobility up to recent times. As late as 1954 Khrushchev could say, when he went to Uzbekistan in Soviet Central Asia, that it was his first visit to that part of the Soviet Union. Since that time he has journeyed widely in Europe and Asia, but he has yet to "fill his eyes" in the land of his chief "competitor," North America.

The Premier is married, reportedly for the second time. There is little information about Madame Nina Khrushcheva, but she is described as a reserved, soft-spoken, and gracious person who, it might be said, serves as a quiet reservoir of strength for her ebullient husband. The Khrushchev family is

large, with "many" daughters and at least two sons, one of whom lost his life in World War II. A second boy, (Sergei) studied engineering. There are at least two grandchildren, whom Khrushchev allegedly loves to cajole with and carry piggy-back. They spend their holidays at his Black Sea mansion, to which he often retreats for rest from his dynamo-like political life. Kidney trouble and age have forced him to slacken his pace in the past year. His health and mind appear otherwise unimpaired, and it seems that he plans to stay at the helm at least until the conclusion of his seven-year plan, when he will be seventy-one.

*In Conclusion.* Nikita Khrushchev is not a singular, isolated political phenomenon. In one sense, he represents, in part at least, the Russian answer to 1861, the year Tsar Alexander II undertook to liberate nearly fifty million serfs. Russian peasants in the last one hundred years have been subject to great social, cultural, industrial, and political revolutions — bringing forth men, who like Khrushchev, are experiencing for the first time mastery over material power. The Premier declares himself a Communist, but before that he is a tenacious and awakened Russian peasant. His inborn traits and sentiments have to some extent conditioned his rule, but he has shown but slight interest in the traditional goals of Russian peasantry. Soviet experience has made him a representative of a small core of Party careerists who together seek to perpetuate their rule and their plans, semi-feudal and collectivist, on the entire country.

Through his own activities and speeches, and through the artifices of propaganda, Khrushchev has built a small but direct ideological bridge between himself and Lenin, the Communist demi-god. The ouster of nearly all leading Stalinist lieutenants made this step possible and has ushered in a new period of Soviet history. Behind the new leadership are forces demanding new methods and new goals. Although the latter are dressed in much the same jargon as before, the differences show themselves. One of the principal new goals, and one in which Khrushchev has taken a personal part, is the development of Russia's vast tier of land facing on Mongolian Asia, an Asia in

revolution. If the leader's programs in Siberia and the East are successful, he may go down in history as a primary builder of Russian Eurasia. It is the saga of Europe moving eastward, not westward, of which Peter the Great could only faintly see the features. But like his ancestors, Khrushchev faces both internal and external problems that challenge his plans for Russia. He is faced in the West by a technically superior civilization that twice in his lifetime has been mobilized by the Germans against Russia, and in the East by poor and hungry masses whose ancestors, in hordes, twice have swept across the Russian-guarded plain into Europe. In the years ahead, Khrushchev and his aides will have to secure Russian Eurasia through tremendous human and material investments. They will be faced with a choice of "going it alone," or getting an accommodation with major powers whose interest will be stability in the cultural-political evolution of the peoples inhabiting the world's heartland.

As an experienced agricultural and industrial manager, Khrushchev must realize what is involved, and doubtless he will seek internal solutions mainly along Soviet lines. If he is sensitive to his own responsibility toward the need for world balance in the great enterprise of human development, he may seize an opportunity to crown his career with statesmanship. The visible features of Khrushchev the politician, and of his immediate successors, may conceal from us this possibility. Khrushchev could still surprise the world.

# The Myth Behind "Dr. Zhivago"

BY R. E. STEUSSY

ONE cannot expect any common agreement about detailed interpretation of a novel as complex as Pasternak's *chef d'oeuvre*. It is so many things that it is perhaps best to state first what it is not, namely a novel in the tradition of Russian realism, varied as that tradition was. Despite the frequent mention of past literary greats, both Russian and foreign, and predominately of the nineteenth-century age of realism, this novel cannot be meaningfully discussed in terms of any variety of realism. Aside from the chief protagonist there is not a single major character with convincing human traits sufficient to constitute a personality. Zhivago himself only escapes abstraction because of the autobiographical nature of his portrayal and then not entirely.

A proper analysis of *Dr. Zhivago* must take as its starting point the novel's kinship with the symbolist movement, that literary trend developed so strongly in the Russia of the first decade of this century — the era of Pasternak's youth. This is not to claim that it is a symbolist novel in the sense that it is reminiscent of the novels of that period, but only to recognize that it is a by-product of that age a half-century later. This fact explains the atavistic aura about the novel more accurately than any reputed debt to the masters of Russian realism. Russian symbolism, however, produced novels of a strictly limited scope and vastly different in style than Pasternak's, whose debt to symbolism is owed primarily not to its novelists, but to its theoreticians and poets, of whom Blok alone is mentioned, reverently, in the novel. The outstanding distinction between Pasternak and the Russian symbolists is that they tended to be deliberately "decadent" in reaction to the puritan theories of their predecessors. The Soviets, of course, were quick to smear Pasternak with this brush, and later threw the whole bucket of tar at him, but that epithet

is singularly inappropriate in its primary meaning, without political overtones.

Nevertheless, Pasternak's basic affinity to the principles of symbolism must be said to lie at the very core of *Dr. Zhivago*. In direct reaction to both realism and naturalism, Russian symbolism was exceedingly myth-oriented, to the point of exhorting the creation of its own myths rather than relying on inheritances from prehistoric times and the classical period. It is my thesis that *Dr. Zhivago* is first and foremost a work constructed around a myth. It is, admittedly, an unusual species of myth, neither hoary with age nor originating with Pasternak or symbolism. It is a product of that same nineteenth-century Russia which in its last decade produced symbolism, and witnessed the birth of Pasternak himself. It is a myth, too, that was once well on the road to oblivion, but which now seems destined to last as long as Russian history itself. It is the myth of the inevitability of the Revolution, seemingly, since October 1917, confirmed by events.

Pasternak's attachment to myth in general comes out fairly early in the novel, when Zhivago remarks: "... facts don't exist until man puts into them something of his own, a bit of free human genius — of myth." The most obvious evidence of his belief in the inevitability of the Revolution is contained in the title of this same chapter, "The Hour of the Inevitable," which concludes with the outbreak of revolution. But there is also an abundance of very conclusive indirect evidence, including the key word, "predestination." This word and related ones such as "fate" permeate the book to the degree that it becomes a foregone conclusion that they must have overriding significance. Zhivago is not simply the victim of a Calvinist-type "Predestination," but of three separable, yet equally inexorable, predestinations working toward his doom. The one Pasternak chooses to emphasize after his death is that of the candle burning on the table, which is the link with Lara. But on the purely physical level his fate is foreordained early in his diary, when an illness reveals to him for the first time that he has inherited his "poor mother's heart." Even before either of these, however, Zhivago ties his own fate to that of his half-brother, Evgraf. It is this

supernatural element so evident with the introduction of Evgraf that is the key to the myth behind the novel. Evgraf may be said to represent "Predestination" with a capital "P," although there is predestination on other levels as well. That this "Predestination" is first of all the inevitability of the Revolution is crystal clear from the following: prior even to his initial entrance into the action of the novel Evgraf looms as a figure of potential significance. He is mentioned just once, years before, as a ten-year-old, a young half-brother of Yurii, the student. The latter mentions him innocuously enough in connection with their father's estate, an inheritance that Yurii, by the way, has renounced:

"It appears that while Mother was still alive, Father became infatuated with a certain eccentric princess Stolbunova-Enrici. This lady had a son by him, Evgraf; he is 10 years old." But the subsequent paragraph is the one which is the key to Evgraf, even though his name is altogether absent: "The princess is a recluse. She lives — God knows on what — in her house just outside Omsk, and she never goes out. I've seen a photograph of the house. It's very handsome with five French windows and stucco medallions on the cornices. And recently I've been having the feeling that the house was staring at me nastily, out of all its five windows, right across all the thousands of miles between Siberia and Moscow, and that sooner or later it would give me the evil eye. So what do I want with all this — imaginary capital, phony claimants, malice, envy? And lawyers." After this is it reasonable to expect that anything genuinely good for Zhivago can come from Evgraf?

Now, consider the above paragraph along with the Siberian half-brother's first encounter with Zhivago in a Moscow lobby. During this incident the name of Evgraf never occurs, and it is the surrounding circumstances which are of primary significance, not the physical description, striking as it is. The time is after 10:00 p.m. during a snowstorm "one evening in late October (Old Style)" (no need to be more specific, we know what millenium it is outside in the courtyard.) Zhivago goes out and purchases an "extra" proclaiming "that Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat were established in Russia." Seek-



ing shelter in a lobby to read his paper he is distracted by a stranger stopping at the foot of the stairs: "Before him stood a boy of about eighteen in a reindeer cap and a stiff reindeer coat worn, as in Siberia, fur side out. He was dark and had narrow Kirghiz eyes. His face had an aristocratic quality, the fugitive spark and reticent delicacy that give an impression of remoteness and are sometimes found in people of complex mixed parentage." The author leaves no doubt whatever that this was Evgraf when the latter first renders aid at the time of the doctor's siege of typhus which developed not long thereafter. During his convalescence the following conversation occurs between Tonia and Zhivago:

"He (Evgraf) came every day while you were ill."

"Does he wear a reindeer coat?"

"That's right. So you did see him. You were unconscious nearly all the time. He said he had run into you on the stairs in some house or other." The doctor had "seen" him, but only through his delirium in which he imagined he was trying to write: "Only now and then a boy got in his way, a boy with narrow Kirghiz eyes, in an unbuttoned reindeer coat worn fur side out as in the Urals or Siberia." This description is followed directly by the remark: "He knew for certain that this boy was the spirit of his death or to put it quite plainly, that he was his death." It is clear that the evil eye earlier emanating from the house in Omsk has definitely been transferred to the boy who grew up in that house.

True to this feverish premonition, Evgraf returns for Zhivago's death and comes into his own, so to speak, only after its occurrence. By this I mean that on recapitulation one is aware he maintains a sphinx-like silence as long as the doctor is alive. Up to that point all his conversations are reported second-hand, and the same is true again in the epilogue despite his important worldly role there. Evgraf speaks only once in the entire 500-odd pages, and then it is only a long conversation with Lara, that same Lara who is, as the title of her chapter so ambiguously indicates, "A Girl from a Different World," and who is herself predestined not to long survive Zhivago.

The question of the interpretation of Pasternak's novel as a

whole would seem to hinge upon this enigmatic presence, Evgraf Zhivago. Although the novel moves along well during the great stretches when he is missing, nevertheless in the closing stages he is far too prominent to be either ignored, or half-apologetically dismissed as a *deus ex machina* introduced to help the hero through tight spots. It is true that Pasternak himself does his best to foster the latter attitude at the conclusion of Zhivago's aforementioned diary, that remarkable document which constitutes the first one-third of the chapter "Varykino." Its very last sentence puts the rather disingenuous question, "Perhaps in every life there has to be, in addition to other protagonists, a secret, unknown force, an almost symbolic figure who comes unsummoned to the rescue, and perhaps in mine Evgraf my brother, plays the part of this hidden benefactor?" This is followed directly by the statement: "At this point Yurii Andreievich's diary breaks off. He never went on with it."

It is practically a truism to assert that the reader should not accept the author at his word in matters of this sort. This would seem to hold especially in a case such as this where it is put in the form of pure conjecture, and then suddenly dropped. Isn't this an all too transparent attempt on the part of Pasternak to induce the reader to forget that although Evgraf has here just played the prescribed role for a second time (the first was when Zhivago fell victim to typhus) he had appeared once previously under more ambiguous circumstances, and not mentioned by name? And why is this "benefactor" lost from sight now for two hundred pages, only to re-emerge when his elder brother is about to die? Once again it is difficult not to accuse the author of being somewhat disingenuous when he writes that Evgraf had not been seen or heard from in more than three years. The reader has not heard of him since the diary early in the civil war, some ten years before the "Conclusion." The matter is complicated by the existence of two additional "benefactors." The first of these is the unnamed political leader the doctor finds beaten into unconsciousness on the streets of Moscow and nurses back to health. The natural reward for these services was that "... for years afterward this man acted as his protector ... " Curiously enough, however, this guardian is referred to



only once, when he turns out to be too much of a revolutionary idealist to be a classic "protector," proving of little practical value.

More conspicuous, of course, is that ubiquitous lawyer and Social Democrat operating in the Urals with the unlikely name of Samdeviatov, a Russianized form of San Donato "according to the family legend." His role is in many ways analogous to those instances where Evgraf functions as a good Samaritan, if on a more day-to-day basis. But quite unlike Evgraf he is suspected of ulterior motives in his kindness, for Zhivago, on his return from captivity, wonders if Lara has had an affair with this entrepreneur of revolution. She assures him that Samdeviatov is far too reminiscent of her *bête noire*, Komarovsky, also a lawyer, for anything to have occurred between them. In addition to the physical assistance which he unstintingly rendered, Samdeviatov was conveniently on hand at the very moment the Zhivagos arrived in Yuriatin to explain to the newcomers all they needed to know about the situation in the Urals and the people they would come in contact with. This omniscience on the local level, plus his ability and readiness to supply all wants, indeed does lead the doctor to compare Evgraf to him:

"He (Evgraf) stayed about two weeks, went often to Yuriatin, and then vanished suddenly as if the earth had swallowed him. I realized while he was staying with us that he had even more influence than Samdeviatov and that his work and his connections were even more mysterious."

But Samdeviatov was ably providing for the doctor in the Urals before Evgraf visited him, just as back in Moscow he had the protection of the unnamed political figure before he received assistance from his half-brother. Thus in either case, although more efficacious, Evgraf would seem to be largely superfluous, at least until the "Conclusion." It would be presumptuous, however, to dismiss his good deeds as redundant. After all, in this very book, if in a different context, Pasternak utters the dictum: "Only the superfluous is sordid." This may be accepted as *prima facie* evidence therefore, that he regards absolutely nothing in this book as superfluous, or it would not be there, for "sordid," like "decadent," is one word scarcely appli-

cable to any facet of "Dr. Zhivago." Accordingly, while Evgraf is not done justice by the "benefactor" theory, it should be remembered that he has this positive side, even before Zhivago's death. He showed this other face not only when acting as a benefactor, but also during Zhivago's previously-mentioned delirium, when the latter imagined his specter to be helping him write a poem: "Yet how could he be his death if he was helping him write a poem? How could death be useful, how was it possible for death to be a help?" The poems at the end of the novel are at least in part an answer to these questions.

The aura of mystery surrounding Evgraf is in a sense dispelled both literally and figuratively only in the epilogue. It there becomes apparent that although inextricably bound up with the inevitability of the Revolution and with Zhivago's ultimate death, he still has a further role to play. Here we enter into a corollary myth concerning the Revolution, namely that the Bolshevik triumph was the vindication of the supremacy of Russia's Eurasian substratum over the Europeanized culture of her upper classes. Evgraf must thus be explained as a device used to illustrate a cultural allegory. Specifically, what purpose can he serve unless he symbolizes "Evraziya," cultural Eurasia? At first glance this solution appears almost too pat to warrant serious consideration. It is as if one were to argue for a primary Dostoevskian influence in the book based upon the fact that Lara's brother, like Raskolnikov, is named Rodion, and that her own relationship with Komarovsky, at the beginning at least, has similarities to that of Raskolnikov's sister, Dunia, with Svidrigailov, that Dostoevskian incarnation of pure, unadulterated lechery.

Yet the obvious should not be dismissed off-hand. Unlike Lara, there is no substantiation whatever in the work for Evgraf on a human level. He is a complete enigma to Zhivago, only smiles in reply to questions, and never speaks with him or with anyone else directly, with the single exception above. He is indelibly impressed upon the reader's mind not as an individual, but as a pair of narrow Kirghiz eyes above a reindeer coat worn Siberian fashion, fur side out. Only in the epilogue does he lose his awesome quality, when this description is in effect parodied

by Tania: "Nothing special about him, just like everybody else. He's got slit eyes and black hair." But Tania herself was raised in Siberia and must likewise be regarded as a product of Eurasia, and indeed is considered that way by the author. And where is Evgraf's place of origin but Omsk, the heart of geographic Eurasia, and the old tsarist seat of government for Siberia? Eurasia is, of course, used here primarily not in the geographic but in a purely technical sense as a term to distinguish Russian culture from that of both Europe and Asia, combining features of both. In other words, this is a purely Russian phenomenon having nothing to do with that part of classical Asia absorbed by the Russian Empire, as it might for instance have had if the "evil eye" had been given Zhivago from Samarkand.

One such abstraction does not make an allegory, but if Evgraf is the doctor's half-brother, a tell-tale relationship in itself, Zhivago must be representative of the old Europeanized Russian culture of the late Romanov era. This is not to deny his human characteristics, for he is to a certain extent Pasternak himself, but beyond that he is a symbol of Pasternak's culture, that of the modernist movement in Russia directly preceding 1914.

It is as this abstraction, not as an individual, that Zhivago had to die, not only had to die, but was "predestined" to die in 1929. Since the epilogue presumably takes the book into the "thaw" after Stalin's death, why did he have to die precisely when he did, and not in the Revolution of the teens, the Civil War, the purges of the thirties, or the war of the forties? He was "predestined" to die just then because 1929 was the year that the first Five-Year-Plan effectively throttled the last vestiges of the old tsarist, westernized culture in Russia. Like Zhivago they had survived somehow the War, Revolution, Civil War, and NEP only to succumb under Stalinism. Zhivago's death, incidentally, is dated only some seven months before that other great modernist poet, Mayakovsky, whom Pasternak praised in *Safe Conduct* took his own life. But a culture cannot commit suicide in a single stroke. Zhivago's death could not be so clean-cut.

In terms of cultural allegory, and only in these terms, can that strange coincidence marking this death be removed from

the category of the superfluous. Why should an old Swiss lady in lilac look upon the corpse without recognition, and then continue her way? Note that she had known Zhivago and Lara for only a few weeks during the *Kerensky* regime, although that regime is never mentioned by name, nor is any other political regime as such. The vicissitudes of war had thrown them together in the house of her now-imprisoned former employer where she had been governess. She is undoubtedly a symbol of that Western culture to which tsarist Russia's culture was so indebted, but by this point in the progress of the novel the author deems her far along the road toward senility. Nor does she merely stumble upon the scene of Zhivago's collapse and death. She is walking along parallel to the trolley on which he is riding, and because the vehicle, in need of repair, is proceeding by fits and starts he sees her several times, also without recognition. It is by her parallel course to this trolley, obviously representative of the Soviet state (which precipitates his death) that Zhivago is evidently led to ponder on "something like a theory of relativity governing the hippodrome of life." As has been indicated, this symbol of western culture is hardly a flattering one, either in general or in detail, and "most unkind cut of all," she is carrying her personal documents "done up in a bundle and tied with a ribbon." What a devastating thrust at that (Western) preoccupation with empty forms at the expense of life, which Zhivago had previously so eloquently disparaged. And who better than a stodgy Swiss to epitomize this tendency?

To turn to the two women whose lives are intertwined with that of the doctor, the less complicated role, quite naturally, is that played by his wife, Tonia. In contrast to her successor she has no feminine attributes beyond motherly love, that is, insofar as the reader is informed. Tonia is pure abstraction, not a single physical trait is ever revealed, unless pregnancy can be referred to as such. All we know is that she is the same age as Zhivago, who was raised by her parents after he was orphaned. Her mother on her deathbed declares them engaged, but no formal betrothal takes place, and the wedding is mentioned only once, two years after it is said to have occurred.

Her actions likewise belie her sex. The most outstanding ex-

ample is, of course, when Zhivago writes from the front about having met a nurse, Antipova, born in the Urals, who turned out to be the "girl student who shot at the public prosecutor on that terrible night of your mother's death." She incongruously replies that he is free to go off with "that wonderful nurse." His rejoinder is that if he gave her cause to write that way he must be misleading "that other woman" too, and he will apologize to her as well. When he comes back to Moscow she confesses that she wrote nonsense, although when they move on to the Urals she again reveals undue apprehension about Antipova. Perhaps not entirely undue, but Zhivago is there over a year before he feels impelled to seek out Lara, and when on the verge of being forced to choose between wife and mistress he is kidnapped by Red partisans. Nevertheless, in a farewell note before leaving Russia, Tonia continues to assume fatalistically that she has lost to Lara and will never see Zhivago again. She insists to the last that she loves him, but that he doesn't love her. The fact remains that she voluntarily yielded her place to Lara in a most unfeminine manner.

As has been noted, Lara from the very outset is a "girl from a different world." Taking the novel on the human level it is impossible to imagine how Zhivago could have retained the slightest trace of loyalty to the featureless Tonia when in the presence of this beautiful creature. She is deeply religious, makes everyone with whom she comes in contact at ease, and has an ineffable feminine beauty. This is, moreover, a pristine natural beauty, which she makes no effort to capitalize upon. As Zhivago is led once to remark to himself: "It's as though she were punishing herself for being beautiful." As her husband, Pasha, tells the doctor before his suicide, it was for her, a living indictment of the age, that he was driven to becoming a revolutionary leader, i.e. was driven to his death, for the Revolution has turned on him and is relentlessly hunting him down. It is interesting that earlier Zhivago had compared himself with Pasha, calling him, in the only Shakespearean quotation in the novel, "One writ with me in sour misfortune's book." Yet Lara's fate is more bitter than that of either of them. In spite of her loathing for the unprincipled Komarovsky she cannot break



away from him, as Zhivago, indeed predicted: "Perhaps there is something in your loathing that keeps you in subjection to him more than to any man whom you love of your own free will, without compulsion." This was shortly after Lara had said: "So he was your evil genius too! It brings us even closer! It must be predestination!" She can leave him only in time to appear for Zhivago's funeral, and to meet her own doom, which is inseparable from that of Zhivago.

The relations of these two women with the protagonist follow the line of his musings on the train home from the front. Here it is clearly stated that he associates Tonia with his loyalty to the past, including the revolution of 1905 and the modernist trends in pre-war Russia. Lara, on the other hand, is associated with the current (February) revolution. It is she "about whose past he knew nothing, who never blamed anyone but whose very silence seemed to be a complaint, and who was mysteriously reserved and so strong in her reserve." He recognizes these two attachments as incompatible, and the remainder of the novel may be characterized primarily as the failure of the effort he resolves upon at this point not to love Lara. There are, in fact, definite implications that this ill-starred loyalty to the past may have doomed their relationship from the beginning. The first of these is in the library at Yuriatin when he sees Lara for the first time since the war but resists the impulse to speak to her: "But a shyness and lack of simplicity alien to his nature, had, in the past crept into his relationship with her and now held him back." His inability to choose between Lara and Tonia is brought out by such diverse figures as Komarovsky at Varykino, and in the "Conclusion" by Markel, who accusingly tells the doctor that if he protected Tonia she would not now be traipsing around Europe.

Be that as it may, Lara never blames him, as he never blames her, for she has her own past. At his bier she laments: "No one is left. One has died. The other has killed himself. And only that one is left alive who should have been killed . . ." The latter is of course Komarovsky, "that monster of mediocrity," that "caricature of vulgarity" as she now calls him. This is exactly what he has been from the moment the elder Zhivago was driven to

suicide by this "thickset, arrogant, clean-shaven, well-dressed lawyer." Some time before he seduces Lara, his bulldog, Jack, symbolically tears her stocking, and subsequently the author attributes the dog's hatred of Lara to fear that "she would infect its master with something human." Komarovsky's domination of Lara is cited as proof of the "terrifying" fact: "The strong are dominated by the weak and ignoble." Statements of this kind relative to Komarovsky are so abundant that one is ultimately forced to conclude he has much more in common with a villain from an old-fashioned melodrama than with any Russian lawyer of the early twentieth century. To cast a lawyer in such a role, of course, is merely to pay homage to an old Russian tradition.

To turn to Pasha Antipov, Lara's husband, he is, next to Zhivago, the most human character in the book. The kinship Zhivago feels with him has already been mentioned. The chief difference between them is that whereas the doctor is the genius, Pasha is the plodder, the son of a worker exiled after 1905, who has risen by dint of hard work to become a provincial schoolteacher. An unsophisticated idealist, he was disillusioned by the war and so predisposed toward the revolution. His marriage with Lara (also a teacher) is poisoned by his sensitivity concerning his humble origin. This finally leads him to volunteer as an officer-candidate to escape from himself. Despite his descent into the maelstrom of blood which is the revolution and which finally sucks him under, he is admired by Lara and Zhivago for his idealism, and the former insists he still loves her, his apparent callousness notwithstanding. His Achilles' heel is that he has become abstract, taken up a quarrel with history, "as if a living human face had become an embodiment of a principle, the image of an idea."

It seems ironical that this should be said of any single character in the novel, when in reality it applies almost equally to all. By this time it should be fairly clear that we have here an allegorical development of the Russian revolutions, which incidentally criticizes the whole of modern industrialized society, not only Communism. Along with censure of the revolution as it turned out in fact there are a goodly number of castigations of urban society with application far beyond the boundaries of

Russia. I am attempting to show only the main outline of the allegory. The minor characters and events in all probability fit this pattern. A proper study of these, however, can only be done by someone who, like Pasternak, lived through the revolutions.

As for the main participants, as we said in the beginning, the key to the allegory is the enigmatic presence of Evgraf Zhivago. If he is the triumph of "Eurasia" in a cultural sense, and there seems to be no alternative reason for his existence, then Zhivago must be representative of Pasternak's own Europeanized culture. Lara is accordingly the symbol of the revolution as idealized, Revolution with a capital "R" (apparently the February Revolution if successful would have been this ideal one). That this is a European ideal is clear from Lara's parents, a Belgian engineer and a Russianized Frenchwoman. Her husband, Antipov, represents the failure of the revolution in practice to become worthy of this Ideal Revolution, just as Zhivago is the hesitant Russian intellectual wedded to Tonia, the "bourgeois" revolution of 1905, so his consequent failure to embrace unstintingly the new revolution also helps lead to its degeneration into Bolshevism. At the same time his lack of complete loyalty to his wife, his refusal to choose between the ideals of 1905 and those of 1917, leads to her exile in Paris and consequently obscurity. "Eurasia" in the form of Evgraf looms before Zhivago simultaneously with the news of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. From this point on his fate is sealed.

Evgraf is, however, only the manifestation of "the inevitability of the Revolution," the cause lies elsewhere. In order to accept Pasternak's myth one has to be convinced of the utter and absolutely irredeemable corruption of the old Russian social order beneath its veneer of Europeanized culture. Thus, the "inevitability of the Revolution," the truth of Pasternak's myth, is embodied in Komarovsky, symbolic of all that was evil in old Russia, the cold, calculating seducer who despoiled Lara before she had a chance to live, the "evil genius" of the entire development. This is no less true simply because he cannot be held directly responsible for Pasha's suicide, Zhivago's heart attack, or Lara's disappearance, becoming a nameless number in the frozen north. Pasha's suicide is after all the suicide of the revo-



lution in the fratricidal strife of the civil war, Zhivago's heart attack is brought about by suffocation in the stifling atmosphere of the Soviet "trolley" (while the senile West goes blithely on its way), and Lara's oblivion is that of the last vestiges of Revolutionary Idealism in Stalin's labor camps. All in all, however, Komarovsky's role hardly bears close analysis, either on the personnel or allegorical level, and one must conclude on reflection that the novel's impact suffers not from a *deus ex machina* but rather from a *diabolus ex machina*.

The epilogue is justifiable only in an allegorical sense. Certainly with the three chief characters long since dead it has no intrinsic significance on a mundane level, consisting as it does chiefly of conversations between inconsequential secondary figures. As mentioned earlier, what is noteworthy is that Evgraf Zhivago comes into his own, without being seen in person. He is the agency selected for the care of Tania, Zhivago's natural daughter by Lara. If this epilogue were significant on a personal level some mention would be expected of the five other children (Lara's daughter by Pasha, and Zhivago's four by two "wives") but these are of no symbolic value: Zhivago's two legitimate heirs are lost to the West, the two by the last liaison have presumably been swallowed up by "Eurasia," and Lara's legitimate daughter has dropped from sight without mention as mysteriously as did her mother and brother much earlier. Pasternak's attempt at worldly optimism, primarily via Tania, however, lacks conviction, in contrast to the Christian metaphysical hope in the attached poems. Tania is still the daughter of the pre-war culture and Revolutionary Idealism, but the almost inhuman ordeal of her childhood has removed her far from them. Also, there is no positive indication that Evgraf, her guardian, has any real qualification for bettering her lot. Perhaps his worldly title of "Major General" bears the implication that he can do so only in a purely physical sense.

Evgraf's diligence, by the way, in collecting the writings of his deceased half-brother is exactly descriptive of the Soviet attitude toward the old tsarist Russian culture. Rendered by their own dogma generically incapable of producing any independent culture, the Soviets are reduced to laboriously cata-

logging the documents of that earlier culture.

What Pasternak is actually saying in the epilogue it seems to me is that Evgraf Andreievich Zhivago is a far cry from Yurii Andreievich Zhivago, granted that they are half-brothers. In effect the present situation is that the European elder son of Andrew (the apostle Andrew is the legendary patron saint of Russia) has vanished never to return and has been supplanted by the Eurasian son of Andrew, an unknown quantity. Whatever the ultimate outcome, it is bound to be far removed from the former culture. Pasternak in the second paragraph of the epilogue's final section seems quite explicit on this point: "Moscow now struck them not as the stage of the events connected with him but as the main protagonist of a long story, the end of which they had reached that evening, book in hand."

How can this be interpreted but that Zhivago has written "finis" to the Russia that was? That with the death of Zhivago in 1929 came the end of a cultural era? Further, that his Eurasian successor will never produce a book like the present one?

# American Research on Russia's Moslems

BY SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

SOME ninety years ago a young American diplomat named Eugene Schuyler who at that time was serving as American consul in Moscow undertook an extensive journey through Russian Central Asia, lands recently conquered by the Russians. The result of that journey was a two-volume study, *Turkistan*, which has remained to the present time the best first-hand American eye-witness report on this vast Moslem region of Russia.<sup>1</sup> This keen and astute diplomat was one of the first western observers of the Russians' administration of their newly acquired territory. In his book Schuyler pointed out, for instance, that tsarist policy in the empire's eastern, non-Russian territories differed markedly from the colonial systems of most of the West European powers. According to Schuyler Russian policy in Turkistan was characterized by the absence of racial and religious prejudice on the part of the conquerors toward the natives of Central Asia, the curtailment of missionary work and forced conversions, and the widespread use of Moslem subjects in responsible administrative positions. For example, the first chief of the Russian police in Tashkent, the new administrative capital of Central Asia, was a Tatar well known for his strict Moslem views.

It is hardly surprising that the fate of the Moslems, a large and "exotic" group of Russia's subjects — which amounted to about a tenth of the entire population of Imperial Russia, and maintains the same percentage in the Soviet Union — has recent-

<sup>1</sup>E. Schuyler, *Turkistan, Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*. New York, Scribner, 1876. 2 vols. Besides this book Schuyler published other works on Russia, among which his monumental *Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia*. New York, Scribner, 1890, 2 vols., is the most important.

ly attracted the attention of American specialists and students. Schuyler's *Turkistan* was one of the first of a relatively large number of publications to appear in this country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries dealing with Russia's Islamic territories.<sup>2</sup> Most of these books, however, were either the writings of tourists or a reprinting of works by European scholars, among whom the renowned Hungarian Orientalist, Armenius Vambery was perhaps the best authority.<sup>3</sup>

After the Russian revolution of 1917, which in its early stages seemed to promise the peoples of Russia a rapid and progressive development, interest in the "Oriental" nationalities and provinces of Russia could only increase, and the evolvement of Russia's Moslems found quite a few commentators among American journalists, political observers, and scholars.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, however, most of these writers were little prepared for a study of the cultural and social evolution of the Soviet Union's Turkic peoples, who formed the large majority of its Moslem citizens. The material supplied by local or central authorities was accepted by these writers without due critical analysis, while ignorance of local Central Asian mores and dialects prevented these observers from establishing personal contacts with the native population. Particularly during the years of military collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the immediate post-World War II years, the enthusiasm of some American travellers in the eastern part of the Soviet Union overshadowed their attempts at impartial scrutiny of conditions.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The best of them were G. F. Wright, *Asiatic Russia*, New York, 1912, and S. Graham, *Russian Central Asia*, New York, Macmillan, 1916.

<sup>3</sup>A. Vambery, *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*, New York, 1906. Other writings of this prolific Orientalist were published in England but became popular reading in this country as well.

<sup>4</sup>A. E. Hudson, *Kazak Social Structure*, Yale University Press, 1938 and the chapters devoted to Russian Moslems in W. Jochelson, *Peoples of Asiatic Russia*, American Museum of Natural History, 1928, were the only scholarly studies in this field at that time. W. Mandel, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944, and A. A. Davies and S. A. Steigert, *Soviet Asia*, New York, Dial Press, 1942, are typical political publications of those years.

<sup>5</sup>See, for instance, H. A. Wallace, *Soviet Central Asia*, New York, 1946, and the American publication of British writers W. P. and Z. Coates, *Soviets in Central Asia*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1952.

A new era in the study of the Islamic population of the U.S.S.R. began in the early 1950's, when scholars, rather than tourists and politicians, started writing on the past and present of these various national and cultural groups. Harvard University and its Russian Research Center, where some young historians became interested in the Russian nationalities problem, grew in the early 1950's into the major center of Russian-Islamic studies in this country. Richard Pipes, at that time a young graduate of Harvard Graduate School and now Professor of Russian History at the same institution, was the first to initiate the historical examination of the Turkic nationalities of the Soviet Union. His article on the Bashkirs and their activities in the civil war of 1917-1922, published in this review in 1950, was the pioneering research in this field.<sup>6</sup> Many chapters of his excellent study, *Formation of the Soviet Union*, which appeared in 1954, were likewise devoted to the Moslem regions of Russia. Of particular interest for the contemporary history of Islamic groups in Russia and their attitude toward the Soviet regime were those sections of the book which dealt with Moslem Communists. Professor Pipes demonstrated that the Moslems were not immune to revolutionary and Communist propaganda and that a large number of Soviet Moslems lent considerable support to the Communists during the latter's battles with the White Russian armies.<sup>7</sup>

In his *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, which appeared in 1951,<sup>8</sup> another young Harvard historian, Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, now Professor of History at Yale University, gave a clear and penetrating account of the national aspirations of the people of Transcaucasia and their efforts to organize their own statehoods. The chapters on the Azerbaijanis, the main Moslem group of

<sup>6</sup>R. E. Pipes, "The First Experiment in Soviet National Politics — the Bashkir Republic, 1917-1920," *The Russian Review*, IX, 1950, pp. 303-319.

<sup>7</sup>R. E. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. xii and 355. See also his articles, "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia — Trends and Prospects," *Middle Eastern Journal*, spring and summer, 1955.

<sup>8</sup>F. Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1920*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. pp. xiii and 356.

this region, make for particularly absorbing reading. The early period of Central Asian history attracted the attention of the noted Harvard Orientalist, Richard Frye, Agha Kahn Professor of Iranian History and Literature, who, also in 1954, published a *History of Bukhara*.<sup>9</sup>

At about the same time as the appearance of these works an excellent dissertation, *The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia*, by Edward Sokol, was published by the Johns Hopkins Press,<sup>10</sup> and also some studies by the author of the present survey appeared in American and British journals.<sup>11</sup> Edward Sokol's work deserves particular mention because he was the first to give a complete and relatively impartial account of the Central Asian events of 1916 and of the conflict between the Central Asian natives and the tsarist administration.

In the past few years four new books devoted entirely to Russian-Moslem relations have been published in this country, all of which deserve particular mention in this survey: Colonel Charles W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, 1957; A. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*, 1957; Thomas Winner, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*, 1958; and Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Moslem World*, 1959. Of these, the book by Colonel Hostler is deemed

<sup>9</sup>R. Frye, *History of Bukhara*, Medieval Academy, 1954, p. 178.

<sup>10</sup>Edward Sokol, *The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954, p. 184. See also the review of this book by S. Zenkovsky in *AATSEEL Bulletin*, XII, 1954. Among other important works J. K. Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Study*, American Council of Learned Societies, 1949, is valuable for its bibliography; the semi-research, semi-memoirs of T. Dawletschin, *Cultural Life in the Tatar Autonomous Republic*, New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953, should also be mentioned.

<sup>11</sup>Serge A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival," *American Slavic and East European Review*, 1953, pp. 303-318; "Kulturkampf in Prerevolutionary Central Asia," *ibid.* 1955, pp. 15-41; "Ideological Deviation in Soviet Central Asia," *The Slavonic and Eastern European Review*, 1954, pp. 424-43; "The Fate of the Crimean Tatars," *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, October 19, 1952; "The Turks of Russia," *Novyi Zhurnal*, 1956, XLVI, pp. 172-196; and "A Tataro-Bashkir Feud of 1917-1920," *Indiana Slavic Studies*, v. II, 1958, pp. 37-61.



worthy of first place in this survey in view of its broad and all-embracing approach.<sup>12</sup>

The origin and rise of Turkic nationalism forms the most interesting part of Colonel Hostler's research. The author agrees with Professor C. H. Haynes' opinion<sup>13</sup> that "we can readily perceive that nationalism is an attribute even of primitive society," and he points out that militant nationalism has been a characteristic of the Turks' political attitude since their very emergence on the historical scene. In the opinion of this reviewer, however, it is questionable whether it is possible to assume that the dynamic expansionism of the early Turkic conquerors should be interpreted as an expression of nationalism; the term "national aggressiveness" seems more appropriate in describing the military exploits of the Turks and Mongols under Attila, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and the Seljuks. Indeed, as soon as these not-too-numerous nomadic people appeared in the annals of history from the direction of Mongolia and Altai, they immediately revealed an unusual aptness for the role of conquerors and empire builders, a quality matched by their extraordinary capacity for assimilation with the subjugated peoples. Apparently less than one-tenth of the present Turkic-speaking population of Asia and eastern Europe is anthropologically of the original Altaic (Turco-Mongol) stock, the remaining nine-tenths or even more being Turkicized Iranians, Finns, Slavs, Caucasians, or similar admixtures. Hostler reminds the reader that a third of a century ago Arnold Toynbee was puzzled by the rapid Turkization of East Anatolia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries "by a barbarous nomadic people driven out of its native environment on the steppes by some variation of climate." This phenomenon of the rapid assimilation of a dense "sedentary, socially cultured, population" by primitive nomads is particularly striking since "the Seljuks did not have even numerical strength on their side . . . and the invaders' numbers were small." It may be added that the Turks have preserved this aptitude,

<sup>12</sup>Charles W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, New York, F. Praegar, 1957, pp. xiv, 244; see also his articles, "Trends in Pan-Turanism," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 1952, I, and "The Turks and Soviet Central Asia," *Middle East Journal*, 1958, III.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 86.

since the same process can still be observed in the twentieth century, even under Soviet rule: the mountaineers of Daghestan, the Iranians of Azerbaijan and Central Asia, and the Finns of the Volga-Kama basin as late as the 1920's and 1930's were still undergoing the effects of Turkization.

The Turks' vigor, the deeds of their conquering heroes, and their success in subjugating and assimilating alien populations were much-lauded characteristics in the nationalist teachings of the twentieth-century Panturkic ideologists, and still continue to fascinate some of their political leaders. The military tradition, spirit of expansion, and the "ancient" (apparently nomadic) culture of the early Turks, as well as the eventual resurrection of the Turkic empire from the Sea of Japan nearly to the Atlantic, became the preferred topics of such nationalist writers of 1900-1920 as Zia Gek Alp, Hussein Zadeh, Agaev, and others who laid the foundation of modern Turkish and Panturkic nationalism. It should be noted, however, that some more realistic Turkic historians, such as Dj. Validov, readily admitted that the "ancient culture" was merely a myth, while Attila and Genghis Khan were not Turks but Mongols.<sup>14</sup> Although it is more than doubtful that in Russia any considerable number of Moslems have ever been carried away by these somewhat extravagant Panturkic dreams, in Turkey itself in 1910-1918 the Young Turks actively supported the ambitions of Panturkic ideologists and sought to maintain subjugation and to initiate assimilation of the non-Turkic majority of the population in the Ottoman empire. All organizations and activities of non-Turkic national groups were strictly forbidden, and Turkish became the exclusive official language of the administration and schools. Ideas of home rule were energetically combatted and, as an official British handbook summarized the Turkish program, the goal was "one race, one language, one administration." A leading Young Turk announced, "We must Turkify non-Turkish nationalities by force."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Dj. Validov, *Millet ve Millet* (Nation and Nationalism), Orenburg, 1914. See also Chapter 8 in S. A. Zenkovsky, *Panturkism and Islam in Russia*, forthcoming.

<sup>15</sup>Hostler, *op. cit.*, pp. 99, 100.



The assimilating policies of the Young Turks found a sympathetic echo among radical Turkish and Russo-Turkic national ideologists. Such a policy was apparently in agreement with the ancient tradition of Attila and Genghis Khan who, however, in the eyes of these publicists, "did not oppress other nations. Their god was one of peace and devoid of all imperialistic ambitions . . . The Turks had a worthy mission which was to realize the highest moral virtues."<sup>16</sup> These moral virtues, according to the Panturkists, were the foundation of the future Panturkic empire, which was to include not only Turkey, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Altai, but also most of Siberia and the Volga-Ural regions of Russia.<sup>17</sup> The empire of their imagination would have dwarfed that of Genghis Khan. German defeat in 1918 and the disintegration of Ottoman Turkey put an end to these fantastic projects, and Kemal Pasha preferred to build, instead of a universal empire, a small but realistic Turkish republic limited more or less to the borders of Anatolia. However, some Turkic politicians from Russia did not relinquish their hopes. Colonel Hostler was fortunate in finding very illuminating data on their activities in exile, especially in Poland. A group of political "bosses," so-called "colonels," around Pilsudski organized an active campaign of support of national minorities from Russia. They apparently forgot that Belorussians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Lithuanians composed in Poland itself over a third of that resurrected nation, and that supporting secessionism in Russia was playing with fire. Since 1926 this support has been lent Caucasian and Turkic émigrés in Poland, in the hope of eventually dismembering Russia. The so-called "Promethean Club" in Warsaw, lavishly financed by Polish intelligence, became the main agency for this secessionist agitation. More than a dozen Turkic, Caucasian, Crimean, and other national newspapers, among them *Le Prométhé* in Paris, were supported by various Polish diplomatic and military offices. It is an irony of fate that later the Polish minister Golowko, who supported Tatar, Ukrainian, and other anti-Russian secessionists, himself fell victim to anti-Polish separatists who resented

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 106-107, 141-143.

the Polish terror in Galicia. Under Golowko's sponsorship and with the help of Polish taxpayers, the secessionist movement, directed toward the dismemberment of Russia, flourished in Warsaw for more than a decade. "National Committee for Independence representing non-Russian nationalities as well as governments-in-exile were drawn into this project and received regular subsidies and other support," while Turkestani, Caucasian, and Tatar officers were admitted into the Polish army for the purpose of military training.<sup>18</sup>

After Poland's collapse some of these minority politicians and agitators left the country, and after a short stay in Rumania and Switzerland they hurried to Germany. Some of them apparently managed to draw upon the so-called Pilsudski fund of the Polish General Staff abroad and upon the corresponding Nazi institutions simultaneously, despite the fact that Poland and Germany were still at war. Hitler's agencies were no less interested in the Turkic émigré than were the Poles and did their best to attract them into Nazi service in Berlin and Ankara. Tatar and Caucasian politicians found sympathetic reception in Rosenberg's *Ost-Ministerium* and in the SS High Command, which tried with their help to recruit Moslem "volunteers" from among the Soviet prisoners of war. New National Committees for Turkestan, Crimea, the Caucasus, etc., were organized by these two institutions, while the Moslem soldiers were enlisted into Turco-Tatar formations under German command. At the same time the support of the Turco-Tatar emigration and even that of the Turkish military was assiduously solicited by the German ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen, well known to the American security service for his sabotage activities in this country during World War I. During the last war, while the Turkish foreign service claimed to be in sympathy with the Allied cause, concluding two military pacts with Great Britain and being supplied with arms and ammunition from Western sources,<sup>19</sup> the chief of the Turkish general staff, Marshal Chakmak, maintained steady contact with von Papen. Chakmak lent

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 156-160.

<sup>19</sup>See, for instance, Winston Churchill, *Second World War*, New York, 1949-1952, v. I, p. 375, II, pp. 505, 536-7; III, p. 95; IV, p. 705.

his support to the Nazis' recruitment of Turco-Tatars for purposes of sabotage and agitation in Russia, promising to release from active duty in the Turkish army those Caucasian and Turco-Tatar officers who would be useful for such activities.<sup>20</sup> Later, however, when German defeat appeared likely, Turkey rapidly decided to discontinue supporting the Turco-Tatar politicians. Many of them were exiled from Turkey, others were sent to the courts, and some two hundred Moslem refugees from Russia were turned over to the Soviet government.

Very useful, although less colorful than these cloak and dagger reports, are the statistical data on the Turkic peoples contained in Colonel Hostler's book. This information is in general well checked, although it contains some inaccuracies. The Hiung Nu, or Huns, for instance, appear in Chinese sources no earlier than the third century B.C., and not in 2,000 B.C. Colonel Hostler gives the number of Lazes as 46,000 on page 17 and as 100,000-170,000 on page 20. Among the Chuvash, a Turkic people on the upper Volga, only one or two percent are Moslems — hence the Chuvash can hardly be considered a people of Islamic civilization.

More subject to criticism are the pages devoted to the Soviet period and to the so-called "national opposition." The Basmachi movement can by no means be regarded as bearer of the Turkic nationalist spirit. Strongly conservative and led by the clergy and tribal chiefs, the Basmachis loathed the radical Turkic nationalists no less than the Communists. In this connection the noted Panturkist, Velidi Togan, relates that a Lokai *kurbashi* (a Basmachi leader) boasted of having killed scores of infidel Jadids liberal nationalists).<sup>20</sup> The military operations of many Kurbashi detachments were supervised by Russian anti-Communist officers, and Madamin Bek, the leader of the Basmachi movement in Ferghana, long cooperated with Monstrov's Russian peasant army. Likewise, the allegation of some Turkestani émigrés, repeated by Hostler, that a strong anti-Soviet nationalist opposition existed in Central Asia in the 1930's, is doubtful, to say the least. It is undeniable that a large number

<sup>20</sup>A. Velidi Togan, *Bugunku Turkili ve yakin tarihi*, Istanbul, 1942-47, p. 467.

of Central Asian Moslems were victims of the Stalin purges and that Central Asian natives often resented the Communist regime. It would be rather misleading, however, to jump to the conclusion that they necessarily were members of any organized national opposition. The rehabilitation of Ikramov, a former secretary of the Communist Party executed in 1937, whom some Uzbek nationalist émigrés proclaimed a hero of the national anti-Soviet resistance in recent years,<sup>21</sup> is perhaps the best incentive for cautious assertions of the claim of the existence of such organized Central Asian opposition.

Finally, Colonel Hostler has utilized too unreservedly such unreliable publications put out by the Polish espionage service as the previously-mentioned *Le Prométhé* (in French) or *Wschod-Orient* (in Polish), neither of which were scientific or even Turkic nationalist organs but simply cheap propaganda leaflets. All of these shortcomings, however, do not dissipate the over-all favorable impression produced by this work; it is unquestionably a very serious contribution to the study of the Turkic peoples and their national movements.

Alexander G. Park's research on the Sovietization of Central Asia, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*,<sup>22</sup> is in the opinion of this reviewer not only the best American study on Russian Moslems since the publication of Eugene Schuyler's *Turkistan*, but is also a quite unique and insufficiently appreciated pioneer work in the study of Soviet methods of power consolidation in any area. The formation of the administration, mass propaganda media, the struggle with the leading social classes of the *ancien regime*, economic transformation of the region, and many other aspects of Sovietization are for the first time investigated step by step by Park. His method could well serve as a pattern for study of the Soviet regime, but the fact that he deals with a somewhat exotic and restricted area has probably prevented many political scientists and historians specializing in Soviet Russia from even reading his research. Otherwise this book's influence on the method of studying the Soviet regime should

<sup>21</sup>B. Hayit, *Turkestan in XX Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt, 1956, p. 336.

<sup>22</sup>A. G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1957, pp. xiv, 428.

have been overwhelming. The author neither seeks the dramatic behind-the-scenes intrigues of the early Marxist dictators, nor offers a superficial description of political and national clashes. On the contrary, he relegates to a rather secondary place the purely political events of the years 1917-1927 and concentrates almost exclusively on the every-day functioning of various sectors of the Communist administration, a duller but most vital aspect in considering Soviet growth.

The book begins with a description of conditions in Central Asia in 1917, when the revolution caught the local population completely unprepared for any political action of significance. It would not be superfluous to add that in 1917 there was not a single Tajik or Uzbek with a standard Russian or Western European University education. When the Central Asian natives attempted to form an organ for local autonomy they found only a few Uzbek and Tajik intellectuals fitted to head any department of autonomous administration. The majority of the so-called Kokand autonomy administrators, for instance, consisted either of Russian, Azerbaijanis, and Kazakhs, or of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war escaped from Russian camps. Probably still weaker than the political rank-and-file were the "cadres" of the native proletariat. As late as 1926 there were fewer than one hundred thousand industrial and urban workers in all Turkestan, less than half being native Moslems. In view of these socio-structural peculiarities, the build-up of native Communist groups and the Soviet apparatus in Central Asia was a task of vast proportions for the Marxist rulers of Russia. During the years of the civil war, and in view of the emergency conditions and their isolation from Moscow, local Communists and socialists (it must be noted that the Soviet regime in Central Asia preserved a Communist-socialist coalition up to 1919) solved this problem in the following way: power remained in the hands of the local "European" leaders, and the natives were completely excluded from the upper echelons of the regime. After the end of the civil war, when the central Soviet government imposed control over local "usurpers of power," the party Central Committee insisted on the so-called nativization of the administration and the Party. Drastic steps were undertaken to



recruit Moslems into the Communist organization. The story of these efforts to bring more natives into the Soviet police, the party ranks, and administrative organs forms the most valuable part of Park's research.

The earliest native allies of the Soviets were the so-called Jadids (anti-clerical and radical Turkic nationalists) from Bukhara. Having suffered heavily at the hands of the Emir's medieval police, which nearly exterminated Bukhara's free thinking nationalists,<sup>23</sup> the Jadids sought the aid of the Tashkent Marxist rulers. A year later a levy *en masse* led to the augmentation of the Communist Party and regime by Jadids from the former Russian Central Asian provinces. The support lent the Communist regime by these Panturkic nationalists provided the Central Asian Soviet bureaucracy with its first native cadres and acted as a springboard for the further Sovietization of the region. In the early 1920's the Jadids furnished a convenient means for socialization of the native economic and social structure.

In summarizing Park's findings it is possible to conclude that the supporters of the Communist regime in Central Asia were really "international" in their composition. They could be classified into four or five different national groups, each with its own aims. The first consisted of Russians and Ukrainians, most of whom were workers and peasant-settlers. The second, more cosmopolitan, united other European settlers — Poles, Armenians, Estonians, Latvians, Jews, Georgians, etc. Lacking both Russian and Moslem national affiliation, this group furnished the Soviet regime with the staunchest support. In administration, these persons often composed about one-quarter of the upper-level bureaucrats. For instance, the Turkestan Commission established in Tashkent by Moscow was composed of one Armenian, one Georgian, one Latvian, and one Jew (Safarov, Eliava, Peters, Kaganovich). One of the purposes of this commission was to liquidate both "Russian chauvinists" and "Moslem nationalists," a goal which it carried out with some success. The third group consisted of the main fighting force of the Tashkent Soviet during the civil war, the "Internationalist

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 46, 57.



battalion" of former Hungarian, Austrian, and German prisoners of war.<sup>24</sup> The fourth were the Tatar Communists, who were the Soviets' best agents for penetration into the Moslem milieu, and who furnished instructors for the native Soviet armed forces, Communist agitators, and journalists.<sup>25</sup> The last group, perhaps the most numerous in the early 1920's, consisted of the local Moslems led by the Jadid intellectuals. In 1927, out of 26,819 members of local party groups, 11,488 were Uzbeks, while there were 36,131 young Uzbeks in Komsomol. The Moslem Union of "poor peasants," the so-called *Kochi*, had in 1922 some 260,000 members in 2,000 groups.<sup>26</sup> This particular multinational structure of the Soviet apparatus and party ranks inevitably led to national friction and, finally to terror, started, as mentioned above, by the Turkestan Commission against both the native and the Russian-Ukrainian settlers. While in the first years of their regime the Communists leaned heavily on the Russian-Ukrainian workers, they energetically recruited in the ensuing period the native Moslems, always with the help of Jadid fellow-travellers. Some Moslem natives, such as Ikramov, Khojaev, Shahahmedov, and Ryskulov, attained the highest level in the party and the administration, maintaining their influence for almost two decades.

Limitation of space forbids any comprehensive discussion of the wealth of material collected and analyzed by Alexander Park. It gives a very extensive picture of the first decade of Sovietization in Turkestan. The party, education, religion, economics, agriculture, land reform, cultural revolution, and "nationalization" or, better "nativization" of the administration are carefully studied in some 400 pages. Park concludes that, despite very spectacular successes of the Soviet propaganda and educational efforts, they were not able in 1917-1927 to win permanently any sizeable sector of the native population, and their activities "gave rise to a new form of exploitation which, in the context of Russia's nationality problems, may only be described as Soviet colonialism." He adds that "if non-Russian peoples

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 30, 27, 28, 33.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p 52.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 137, 142, 152.

of the U.S.S.R. have felt the sting of Communist police terror, oppression, and exploitation, their burdens have in many respects been no greater than those borne by the Great Russian nation. Mistrust of the popular masses and disbelief in their revolutionary capacities, arising from Lenin's early recognition of the broad divergence between the spontaneous goals of the people and the revolutionary aims of Marxism, runs threadlike through the whole history of Bolshevism in Russia."

In the third book under review here, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*,<sup>27</sup> Thomas G. Winner concentrates on a considerably narrower topic than the previous authors and treats only the folklore, the writings, and, partially, the cultural growth of Russia's Kazakhs, presenting a valuable, detailed survey of the creative genius of this little-known nomadic people. Among the major Turkic tribes before their Russian conquest, the Kazakhs were very little influenced by Islam. Moslem missionaries and learned men from Turkestan or from Kazan penetrated only sporadically into the Kazakh steppe. Winner reminds the reader that in this period Kazakhs' "religious consciousness was so shallow that not a single steppe fighter knew who Mohammed was." It may be added that it was actually Catherine II who, for the purpose of civilizing these nomads, began to send them Volga Tatar missionaries and ordered the building of Moslem schools among them. However, Islam, first introduced into the Kazakh steppe at the end of the eighteenth century, has never been able to make the Kazakhs truly embrace the teachings of Mohammed. Therefore, Kazakh oral and written literature developed far more independently from the classical Iranian and Arabic patterns than did the writings of the Tatars, Turks, or Uzbeks. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the Kazakhs knew only the oral epic and lyric. Written literature began to develop only after the penetration of Russian cultural influence. Russian-Kazakh schools thus "not only trained native administrators, but also brought about to some extent the Russification of the Kazakh culture." At the same time, "the newly trained Kazakh official-

<sup>27</sup>T. G. Winner, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1958, pp. xiv, 269.

dom became acquainted with Russian philosophy and literature and eventually with liberal, democratic, and national thought of the period."<sup>28</sup>

The first representative of the "Westernized" Kazakh intelligentsia was Valikhanov (1837-1865), the scion of an aristocratic family and grandson of a khan. Valikhanov, who served as an officer in the Russian army, became a close friend of Dostoevsky and other Russian intellectuals. He was more a scientist, geographer, and folklorist than a creative writer, but he was nevertheless the first of a type of new Kazakh intellectual which dominated subsequent generations of educated Kazakhs. A "seeker after truth" and a rationalist imbued with the ideas of democracy and social justice, Valikhanov fought resolutely against the influence of Islam and the Moslem clergy over his nomadic compatriots. In Valikhanov's opinion the Islamic impact was even more pernicious for the Kazakh than Byzantine influence was for the Russians. Both corrupted the "folk's soul" and acted as obstacles to the development of a truly national and entirely original culture in which he believed.

Such opposition to Islam characterized the Kazakh mind in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This anticlericalism in general stemmed from the secularized and agnostic views of the Russian intellectual milieu of the time, and spread among educated Kazakhs. Such leading Kazakh intellectuals as the educator, Ibray Altynsarin (1841-1904), and the poet, Abay Kunanbaev (1845-1904), demonstrated in their writings their deep attachment to enlightenment and distaste for the Moslem clergy. Therefore, neither the pan-Islamic ideology, which spread among the Turks and Russian Moslems in the second part of the nineteenth century, nor Panturkism, which was preached in Russia by some Tatars and Azerbaijanis, found any response among the Kazakhs.

Professor Winner has largely disregarded the process of rapid Westernization and secularization of the Kazakhs, and he has also failed to study the spiritual and political conflicts between the Kazakhs and Tatars in the early twentieth century. This conflict, which took an especially sharp form in the years 1917-

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

1919, led to the isolation of the Tatars, who had dominated Russia's Moslem cultural stage up to the end of the nineteenth century. This break led finally to the division of Russia's Turkic peoples into the separate Turkic nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Other pages of Winner's work which call for some criticism deal with Kazakh nationalism, and of their aspirations for independence. Winner did not realize that the anti-Soviet opposition never actually took the form of a secessionist movement. For instance, the head of the Kazakh autonomy in 1917-1919, Dos-Muhamedov, clearly stated that the autonomy did not seek ultimate independence from Russia, but aimed merely at preventing the spread of Communism in the steppe.<sup>20</sup> Even Baitursunov, the leading Kazakh nationalist who called upon his countrymen to preserve their identity from the dangers of Russification and Tatarization, was aware, as were most other Kazakh leaders, that his people were not yet able to organize an independent statehood.

Professor Winner gives a clear picture of the development of Kazakh literature in the last century. The oral creative tradition was deeply Turco-Mongol and nomadic, but the written literature underwent inevitably a profound Russian influence. The populist idea of serving the people dominated all Kazakh creative writing at the beginning of the century, and it is apparent that in the Soviet period the impact of Russian prose and poetry, even of such a modernistic poet as Mayakovsky, was even greater, although in many instances this impact was enforced by the regime and the Party.

The story of the intellectual transformation of this nomadic people — who until some fifty years ago still lived in the medieval world of Genghis Khan — into a "Soviet nation" (the literature of which was exposed to such ultra-modern influence as that of Lenin and Mayakovsky) is a fascinating one, and readers and scholars interested in the "Russian Orient" should be grateful to Professor Winner for a masterful presentation of this sub-

<sup>20</sup>*Uchredit. Siedz Sovetskoi Kirgizskoi (Kazakh) Respubliki*, Alma Ata, 1936, p. xi; cf. M. Chokaev's article in *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1931, p. 406.

ject. Since the author is a student of literature and not of history or political science, the minor errors and somewhat speculative interpretations of Kazakh history, which is only a subsidiary aspect of the work, can readily be excused.

The story of Soviet efforts to win for the cause of the Communist revolution not only the Moslems of Russia but also the Moslem world of the Middle East and Southern Asia is related in Professor Ivar Spector's new mimeographed work, *The Soviet Union and The Muslim World*.<sup>30</sup> The main contribution of this study is a systematic review of Bolshevik diplomacy toward countries of those areas and the publication in English and *in extenso* of such rare documents as the Soviet government's first manifesto to the Moslems of Russia and Asia, an invitation to them to participate in the Congress of the People of the East held in Baku in 1920, and the program of the Communist Party in the East published in Moscow in 1934. Professor Spector points out that the possibility of proletarian revolution in the East was an important point in the Bolshevik's international program from the very first, as was reflected in the publication of the above-mentioned manifesto to the Moslems and other peoples of the East on December 7, 1917. In the crucial years 1917-1919, when all the attention of the Western powers was concentrated on the war with Germany, the activities of the Russian White armies insulated Asia for almost three years from direct contact with the Soviets. Indeed, 1920 the year of the Congress of the Eastern Peoples in Baku, marked the beginning of revolutionary action in Asia. Among the 1300 participants were not only numerous delegates from the national groups of eastern Russia, but also 235 Ottoman Turks, 192 Persians, many Arabs, Chinese, Kurds, et al. "The highest watermark of unity among the delegates was reached during Zinoviev's speech summoning Moslems to Jihad" (to holy war) against the English imperialists — a keynote speech at the opening of the congress. The Baku congress offered Communists an excellent opportunity to recruit agitators and revolutionary leaders among

<sup>30</sup>I. Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World*, distributed by Washington University Press, Seattle, published in 1959.



the participants, and its convocation may now be regarded as the beginning of the Eastern Communist movement.

In subsequent chapters Professor Spector treats diplomatic relations between the Soviet government and the countries of the Middle East, and points out that recognition of the Soviets by Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan considerably boosted Soviet prestige, and forced England, at least, to seek regular contact with Lenin's government. The period 1927-1941 is sketchily surveyed in the book and is described as a "lull in Soviet-Moslem relations." This description is hardly correct, however, since in these very years the Third International built the nucleus of the Middle Eastern Communist parties. Most of the present leaders of the Persian, Arabic, Kurd and Turkish Communist organizations joined the party and received their initiation in revolutionary agitation in these years, when not a single Middle Eastern country was actively combatting Communism. World War II and the post-war period of Soviet-Middle Eastern relations are briefly related, and there is little new material to be found in these pages. The concluding chapter, "Soviet Cultural Impact in the Moslem World," is a more interesting one. It seems that since the last war Russian and Soviet literature has won a considerable circle of readers in the Moslem countries of the Middle East, particularly among the Arabs. Some Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese periodicals regularly allocate pages to translations from Russian literature or to articles about it, while the showing of Soviet films and performances by Soviet artists have acquainted Arab intellectuals and the middle class with the basic patterns and problems of the Soviet culture and state.

Although Professor Spector has not offered in his research a complete or even consistent picture of Soviet-Moslem relations, he has performed a useful work in collecting some important material and data on this little-investigated aspect of Soviet foreign and cultural policy. His research has contributed to an understanding of the vasillations in the Soviets' attitude toward their own Moslem population — vasillations conditioned to a great extent by the demands of foreign relations and propaganda.

This work can be successfully supplemented by other recent



studies of the ideological and political trends in the Middle East as, for instance, the books by George Lenczkowski and Walter Z. Laqueur, which convey a valuable picture of Communism in the Near Asian countries and Soviet relations with them.<sup>31</sup> A more exhaustive survey of American research on Russia's Moslems cannot be made in this article, but it is apparent from these main publications in the field that American scholarship in this area has passed beyond an initial stage and has already contributed a number of very creditable studies on this young and heretofore unexplored sector of Russian history.

<sup>31</sup>George Lenczkowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Cornell University Press, 1956; and Walter Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York, F. Praeger, 1956.

# Some Reflections on Russian Liberalism

BY MARC RAEFF

Two themes have dominated Russian historiography in the West during the last two decades: the origins of the Revolutions of 1917 and the alternatives to them. First in chronology and first in importance were the search for the roots of the revolutions and tracing the sources of Bolshevik ideology. Concern with origins raised the question "what alternatives were there to the revolutionary solution?" for only through an understanding of the nature of the alternatives could the triumph of Bolshevism become fully intelligible. There was, of course, another reason as well: rehabilitate the "vanquished," because the picture of Russia before 1917 would not be complete if the "losers" (ideologically and socially) were omitted. After all, before they became the "losers" they were at times more prominent and significant than their then unknown Bolshevik conquerors. Thus during the last decade, largely under the stimulation and guidance of Professor M. Karpovich at Harvard, much attention and effort has been devoted to the study of Russian liberalism.<sup>1</sup> Yet, in spite of these efforts with their limited success clarifying, illustrating, and explaining specific events, personalities, and problems, no satisfactory overall picture or history of Russian liberalism has emerged thus far. The student of Russia's past has not received a satisfactory (or even partial) answer to the questions: was liberalism a really viable alternative to revolution, and if so, why did it display so little resistance to both reactionary and radical pressures? In the following pages I wish to clarify somewhat the state of our knowledge of Rus-

<sup>1</sup>Independently, but related to this interest, there have been published numerous and important sources of Russian liberalism, mainly in the form of memoirs, cf. the catalogue of the Chekhov Publishing House of the East European Fund, Inc., and the file of *Novyi Zhurnal*, 1942 to date.

sian liberalism and suggest some reasons for the subordinate role it played in the intellectual, political, and social history of Imperial Russia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet historiography does not recognize alternative paths of historical development, it is not interested in the "vanquished." To the extent that it has dealt with "liberalism" (and for that matter conservatism, too) — as it had to for a full history of Russian revolutionary movements and ideas — it has treated liberalism as a set of isolated ideas or events which never combined into a meaningful pattern or trend. Such limited one-sidedness could not satisfy Western historiography as it implied a *vae victis* mentality alien to its humanistic search for truth and historical understanding.<sup>3</sup> This circumstance has contributed in determining an essential characteristic of recent work in the West on Russian liberalism: liberalism was a possible alternative to revolutionary radicalism. Hence, most efforts have been directed at distinguishing liberalism from radicalism, at drawing a sharp and meaningful boundary so that liberalism could not be confused with revolutionary extremism or radicalism. But in their effort at distinguishing liberalism from the "left," historians have neglected the equally important task of setting it off from the "right," from conservatism.<sup>4</sup> If individuals and ideologies are to be categorized it should be on the basis of rather clear and universally acceptable criteria. I am perfectly

<sup>2</sup>I make no pretence at bibliographical completeness. I only wish to raise some questions on the basis of recent literature that has come to my attention.

<sup>3</sup>"Certainly, *vae victis* is not a principle for historians to follow!" M. Karpovich, "Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov" in E. J. Simmons ed., *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, 1955, p. 130.

<sup>4</sup>This is the major failing of Victor Leontovitsch's important study, *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland*, Frankfurt/Main, 1957, especially in its first part. By the same token, incidentally, the desire to set off conservatism from "reaction" has led to the burning of the "left" boundaries of conservatism with the result that we find the same names among the heroes of both liberalism and conservatism for pretty much the same reasons. E.g. Karamzin, classed as a liberal by Leontovitsch (*op. cit.* pp. 73-89) and a conservative by R. E. Pipes, "Karamzin's Conception of Monarchy," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, IV (1957), pp. 35-58.

well aware that this is not an easy matter. While in the nineteenth century — in Russia as well as in the West — the term liberal had a very specific connotation in contrast to reaction, the distinction has become blurred in our days as a result of our experience with "totalitarian democracy." Whereas the boundaries between liberalism and radicalism had been shadowy and mobile in the nineteenth century, those between conservatism and liberalism were drawn sharply and rigidly. But today the reverse is true. A very sharp distinction is now made between traditional liberalism and the revolutionary radicalism which emerged from late eighteenth century enlightenment and utopianism.<sup>5</sup> It is no accident that in recent decades the study of liberal thought has led to a positive reappraisal of conservatism and stressing of liberalism's indebtedness to the juridical and spiritual tradition of the *Standestaat*.<sup>6</sup> This popularity of conservatism in Western historiography is matched nowadays by the great interest in conservative figures and movements among Russian historians in the United States, England, and Germany.<sup>7</sup>

At least two definitions of liberalism (or any other of the major *isms*, for that matter) can be used by the Russian historian. First, we have an absolute definition which would set forth very clearly and precisely the specific, unchangeable, and essential components and characteristics of an ideology or political movement (this can be readily done for Marxism, Communism, and Socialism, though there will be several variants of

<sup>5</sup>J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, London, 1952, pp. 1-16 *passim*. This is also the burden of Sir Isaiah Berlin's interpretation of Herzen in his introduction to *From the Other Shore and The Russian People and Socialism*, London, 1956. Berlin's discussion of Herzen as the Russian "libéral par excellence" is extremely interesting and suggestive. Unfortunately, it is too personal an approach to be very useful in an analysis of "liberalism" as a movement or ideology.

<sup>6</sup>This is illustrated by the popularity of A. de Tocqueville and the "reception" in Anglo-Saxon countries of Otto Gierke's work on medieval and early modern law. See also L. Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom*, 1957; G. Ritter, *Die Dämonie der Macht*, München, 1948; O. Brunner, *Adeliges Landleben und Europäischer Geist*, Salzburg, 1949.

<sup>7</sup>Most of the work is still in progress, but *Vorarbeiten* on various conservative themes can be found in *Harvard Slavic Studies* IV; *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, II, VI.

each). Liberalism (like conservatism) is, however, difficult to define in this way. That is why another approach might be to use a "relativistic," "historicist," and pragmatic definition. Under such a flexible "historicist" definition, liberalism would have different components and a different meaning depending on the time and place.<sup>8</sup> Still, as long as the same term is used in all instances we have in view some specific common principles or concepts. In Russia, however, even this flexible and relativistic definition has not proven adequate. To begin with, borrowing most of their political notions from the West, the Russians — as was only natural — tended to simplify them and, more important still, immediately turned them into directives for action.<sup>9</sup> As a result, in popular Russian terminology (and thinking) liberalism obtained the meaning of opposition to the government, or rejection of state authority. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, little distinction was made between the terms liberal and revolutionary or radical. Liberal was anything that meant or led to a decrease in state power. Hence the opposition was not so much between liberalism and radicalism or even liberalism and conservatism (as witness, e.g. the existence of "slavophile liberals"), as between liberalism and authority in the name of freedom from autocracy and bureaucracy. As a consequence, there was no real understanding, let alone sympathy, for the position of "liberal conservatives or conservative liberals" such as Pushkin, Mordvinov, and later Prince S. Trubetskoi and Maklakov.<sup>10</sup>

The situation was made worse by the concentration on the negative aspect of liberalism. Liberalism was advocated to achieve an escape *from* governmental authority, under all circumstances, regardless of the means used or the proposed alternative program. In this simplifying negativism lay the roots

<sup>8</sup>This was the approach of G. de Ruggiero in his classic *Storia del Liberalismo Europeo*, 1949.

<sup>9</sup>See the stimulating essay by Robert E. MacMaster, "In the Russian Manner: Thought as Incipient Action," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, IV, pp. 263-280.

<sup>10</sup>S. L. Frank, "Pushkin kak politicheskii myslitel," *Etudy o Pushkine*, Munich, 1957, especially pp. 43-57 and the same, *Biografiia P. B. Struve*, New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1956, pp. 213-14.

of many misunderstandings and mislabelings. Because an official or public opinion leader was against autocracy or the tyranny of the bureaucracy he was automatically labeled "liberal." It did not matter what specific ideas and programs he advocated or by what means he wanted to attain a "liberalization" of the system. On the basis of such an oversimplification Alexander I, Speransky, Kiselev, and Loris-Melikov, for instance, were labeled liberals. On the other hand, anyone who defended the authority of the state, of political power, and the traditional concept of a paternalistic monarchy was branded a reactionary; again without regard to the context or the concrete contents of the ideology or program. In some cases those pilloried as conservatives or even reactionaries were in a sense more truly "liberals" than their denounciators, especially if liberalism is to be taken as the defense of the individual and his personal freedom and dignity against *all* attacks (e.g. Dostoevsky, Maklakov, Struve). Finally, Russian history can do little with a relativistic, historicist definition as it would deprive the concept of any definite meaning; liberal would then be always whatever decreases the power of the state at a given moment. This may be a useful approach for political polemics, but it is hardly adequate for historical analysis.

Discarding the relativistic, historicist definitions of liberalism, some writers define liberalism in terms of legality, the juridical guarantee of individual and property rights. Here, liberalism is equated with the establishment and preservation of a *Rechtsstaat*. As a starting point for an analysis of Russian liberalism this approach has great merit and can be very valuable.<sup>11</sup> Yet it also raises serious difficulties. The legalistic notion of liberalism as developed in the West (at least since Montesquieu's time), implies the preservation, reinvigoration, or expansion of a certain set of accepted and well-established norms and legal practices. Legalistic liberalism (to coin a phrase) made sense in a traditional political framework that accepted *a priori*, or on historical grounds, such fundamental legal norms as respect of individual rights, sanctity of property, etc. It was, fundamentally, an extension — and adjustment to the economic and social

<sup>11</sup>This is the core of Leontovitsch's analysis, see *op. cit.* pp. 1-18.



conditions created by the scientific and industrial revolutions — of traditional medieval legal notions of *proprietas* and *potestas*, of feudal concepts of contract and authority, of Christian justice and kinship.<sup>12</sup> But what sense could such notions make in Russia? The Russian reality and historical heritage were those of arbitrary autocracy and bureaucratic tyranny; introduction of real legality could only mean the overthrow of the existing regime, the abolition of traditional state power and political authority. Advocacy of such a course right away led to the blurring of the line between radicalism and liberalism, while a refusal to follow such an extreme course implied the preservation of the existing order, hence conservatism (however much it might be tempered by administrative reforms).<sup>13</sup> How difficult it was to remain a consistent legalistic liberal without being drawn into radical opposition to a government that refused to give way to a true *Rechtsstaat* can be seen from the career of V. A. Maklakov, the sincerest as well as most far-sighted spokesman for legalistic liberalism.<sup>14</sup>

In the domain of economic policy, legalistic liberalism meant the guarantee of individual property rights, the freedom of economic activity. V. Leontovitsch is quite right in devoting so much attention to this important facet of liberalism in Russia.<sup>15</sup> But his own analysis and description show the almost hopelessly

<sup>12</sup>Cf. O. Brunner, *op. cit.*; G. Dietrich, "Regionalismus und ständisches Wesen als ein Grundthema Europäischer Geschichte" *Historische Zeitschrift*, 174 (1852) pp. 307-337; E. H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 1957; H. Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy; The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815*, 1958, especially Introduction and ch. 2.

<sup>13</sup>If I may be permitted, at this point, to make a plea *pro domo mea*: my view of Speransky as a conservative (though enlightened) bureaucrat is based on the belief that he would not and could not have introduced a sufficient degree of legalistic liberalism to change the essential nature of the Russian government. True, some of his plans contained individual abstract liberal notions, but their *dynamic* relation to his total proposals was not at all "liberal" in any essential sense. M. Raeff, *Michael Speransky — Statesman of Imperial Russia*, The Hague, 1957.

<sup>14</sup>V. A. Maklakov, *Iz vospominanii*, New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1954; M. Karpovich, "Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov," *loc. cit.*; Leontovitsch, *op. cit.*, part III. The same was true of P. Struve after 1905, cf. S. Frank, *Biografiia P. B. Struve*.

<sup>15</sup>Leontovitsch, *op. cit.*, part II.

difficult task faced by those who wanted to introduce this form of liberalism into Russia. First of all, it went against the grain of the juridical traditions and norms of the vast majority of the Russian peasantry. This tradition might have been overcome gradually if the proper political, economic, and educational measures had been taken and followed through consistently after the Emancipation. Leontovitsch shows why this was not done; the main reason was again the insuperable barrier of the political order and the radicalism of the potential liberal leaders. When "liberation" from the traditional fetters did finally come and Stolypin introduced juridical liberalism into the domain of land tenure and peasant rights, it was too late; World War I stopped short the process of growth and development of these innovations. In other words, while there was a potentially fertile soil for the establishment and expansion of the economic aspects of legalistic liberalism the latter could not sink solid roots because of the survival of the political and administrative regimes. Again, the primacy of the political factor proved to be the source of Russian misfortunes.

The difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of separating economic-social legalistic liberalism from an active, radical political program plagued the Russian intellectual leadership as well. Harmony between the economic and political facets of liberal demands could easily be achieved in the West in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as they complemented each other and involved the same social classes and economic groups. Not so in Russia where the need of modernizing the economy, of rapidly raising the material and cultural level of the people were essential tasks which did not readily harmonize with a gradual legalistic political program.<sup>16</sup> The combination of political gradualism and the advocacy of active economic individual freedom led, under Russian conditions, to ideological contradictions and paradoxical political programs which terminated in a dead end or in paralysis. This proved to be the tragedy of those "liberals" of the 1860's and 1870's who tried to

<sup>16</sup>See the interesting remarks of A. Gershenkron, "The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the 19th century," *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, pp. 11-39.

devote all their attention to economic and social issues. As a result, later in the century, having learned the hard lesson of Russian political reality, the liberals were all too easily drawn into radicalism.<sup>17</sup>

Liberalism has never been a very precise and clearly defined ideology or philosophic concept, even in the West. Rather, it has been a *method* of political action and a broad view of society and the relationship between individuals and institutions. Historically, it has been associated with the triumph of individualism and the consequent application of individualism to all fields of social and political organization, with the economic and social interests of the bourgeoisie, with the birth of national self consciousness. In the context of these historic circumstances, liberalism has advocated the elimination of "feudal" traditions, concepts, norms. To the extent that liberalism was a method of social and political action it required for its very existence at least some of those social forces, economic conditions, institutional frameworks, and political needs which assured its victory in the West. Did they exist in nineteenth century Russia? Certainly, Russia did have plenty of political needs and demands, but it had neither the economic conditions nor the social forces, at least not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. We are able, as many historians have been, to discover the existence, analyze the nature, and trace the development of individual specific theoretical elements of liberalism (individualism, natural law, economic theories); but their existence did not make for liberalism as a political and social program. After all, what matters is not the individual concept or idea but the dynamic relationship in which it finds itself to other ideas and its historical

<sup>17</sup>This is one of the main themes of G. Fischer, *Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia*, 1958. Cf. also M. Raeff, *The Peasant Commune in the Political Thinking of Russian Publicists: Laissez-faire Liberalism in the Reign of Alexander II* (unpubl. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950); same, "Russia after the Emancipation: Views of a Gentleman Farmer," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXIX, No. 73 (June 1951), pp. 470-485, and "Georges Samarin et la commune paysanne après 1861," *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, XXIX, 1952, pp. 71-81. There are also some curiously interesting remarks on the "staying power" of the bureaucracy in the face of economic pressure in Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, 1957, pp. 179-181.

environment.<sup>18</sup> It is my belief that in Russia, at least until the 1880's, the relationship between liberal concepts and historical circumstances was an inert one; liberalism could not attain a dynamic function in the process of the country's transformation.

After the 1860's, more particularly after 1881 (to use a convenient, though admittedly arbitrary date) economic and social circumstances began to change in favor of a positive and dynamic function of liberalism. But even then it encountered special difficulties. First of all there was always the autocratic state which stood in the way of any meaningful liberal approach and program. It had to be done away with, a necessity which forced even conservative liberals into a radical path.<sup>19</sup> As a result, authority and leadership passed to the more active and radical personalities; thus, Miliukov became the spokesman for the liberals, and according to most observers, he was more of a radical than a true liberal in temperament and outlook.<sup>20</sup> In view of Russian conditions, it seems to me, the more radically-minded liberals were also the more realistic politicians. They could not have foreseen the dangers of totalitarian democracy as inherent in revolutionary radicalism. The pessimistic and hazy forebodings of Struve, Maklakov, Trubetskoi could not impress a generation that had not known the first World War or 1917. Correctly, I feel, they believed that the first obstacle to be removed was the autocracy. But could this be done without radicalism?<sup>21</sup> After all, it was not until 1905 that truly objective conditions for liberalism were created, and even then the political conditions remained much less satisfactory than the economic and social

<sup>18</sup>Ernst Cassirer, "Some Remarks on the Question of the Originality of the Renaissance," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV-1, January, 1943, p. 55.

<sup>19</sup>Some tried to resist, but even the strongest were not always very successful in their resistance to the blandishments of radicalism on the one hand and the hopeless ossification of autocracy on the other. V. A. Maklakov, *Iz vospominanii*; Kn. O. Trubetskaia, *Kniaz' S. N. Trubetskoi — vospominaniia sestry*, New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1953.

<sup>20</sup>M. Karpovich, *op. cit.*; also G. Fischer, V. Leontovitsch, S. Frank (*Biografiia P. Struve*) as well as the memoirs of V. Maklakov and P. N. Miliukov published by the Chekhov Publishing House.

<sup>21</sup>See the very correct analysis G. Fischer gives of the radicalization of the zemstvo leadership (G. Fischer, *op. cit.* chs. 4 and 5).

ones. Nothing but the strongest pressure could have changed the imperial regime.<sup>22</sup>

In accounting for the weakness of liberalism even after 1905 we must take into consideration the relation of the liberals to the peasantry. It would appear that the liberals did not think in terms of the peasantry as such; of its specific economic, social, and legal needs, rather they preferred to think of the Russian people as a whole.<sup>23</sup> In his biography of Struve, Frank observes that the Russian liberal (or intellectual) remained under the spell of populist myths, even when he rejected specific populist notions and programs. Liberals thought and spoke in terms of the Russian people, they hoped to preserve its spiritual and moral integrity (or so they believed) against evil outside influences. But all too often they forgot the peasant, the member of a special group with very specific immediate economic and social needs. To the last, in their agrarian programs, in their relation to Stolypin's policies, the liberals proved inadequate to the political and historical task that should have been theirs.<sup>24</sup>

Besides the various reasons of an economic, social, and political nature suggested above for the weakness of Russian liberalism, there was also another very important factor. The Russian liberals, of whatever hue, belonged to the intelligentsia.<sup>25</sup> Now,

<sup>22</sup>S. Frank in his biography of Struve reminds us that modern nationalism is an integral part of the liberal creed of the West. He further points out that the Russian intelligentsia was unusually devoid of a true understanding of modern nationalism (he even goes so far as to question the very existence of patriotism among the large mass of the intelligentsia — but this is going too far, I think). He is raising a very interesting and important question. Unfortunately, it can not be dealt with here, mainly because the history of nationalism in Russia — as a sentiment and an ideology — has received very scant attention. It is a subject that should engage the attention of Russian historians; a virgin field, it has, however, a large amount of sources and materials that can be readily exploited.

<sup>23</sup>See the stimulating discussion given by Leontovitsch of the liberals' failure to face the peasant problem realistically and honestly.

<sup>24</sup>A similar criticism, alas, can also be often leveled against liberal attitudes to the needs of the growing urban proletariat. S. V. Panina, "Na petersburgskoi okraïne," *Novyi Zhurnal*, 48 (1957).

<sup>25</sup>This was also true of those who started out as practical *zemstvo* leaders in a program of "small deeds"; cf. G. Fischer, *Russian Liberalism* and "The Russian Intelligentsia and Liberalism," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, IV, pp. 317-336.



the characteristic trait of the Russian intelligentsia was that it conceived of its role as one of service to the people (*sluzhenie narodu*). I cannot here go into the reasons for this situation, let me only state the hypothesis that it was closely related to the fact that the intelligentsia's original membership was drawn from the service nobility. However that may be, there is a vast difference between the ideal of *service* and that of *defense* of the interests of a specific group or even of an entire nation. Issued from aristocratic and corporative traditions, Western liberalism developed in defense of particular social and cultural interests and needs. Not being an "interest group" (which makes its moral glory, of course), the Russian intelligentsia could not accept the full implications of the liberal creed and its socio-economic expressions in the West.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the intelligentsia arose in response to a feeling of moral indignation at Russian conditions. It took up "service" for the sake of changing these conditions, of abolishing the moral indignity and injustice which afflicted the Russian people. This resulted in its being always drawn, by avocation, to an activist and — under Russian conditions of the nineteenth century — radical position. Political ideals and concepts, aesthetic and moral values were transmuted into bases for social and political action.<sup>27</sup> This was unavoidable because in order to change the conditions and rectify the social and moral injustices, the political and social orders had to be destroyed. The members of the intelligentsia thus conceived of themselves as charismatic leaders of the people, and in the eyes of public opinion (i.e. the educated), they

<sup>26</sup>We have only to think of Herzen's violent and emotional rejection of the "bourgeois" order in France (see I. Berlin's introduction referred to in footnote 4 above). Incidentally, Western individualism was developed through a dynamic process of struggle against "tribal," "feudal," and "ecclesiastic" communalism and authority. The individualism of the Russian intelligentsia, on the other hand, was rather the "passive" result of their cultural and social isolation in the country. Thus, the Russians' individualism was at the same time more complete and less secure than that of the Western intellectuals. Is that not at least a partial explanation of the yearning of so many Russian intellectuals for communalist ideologies?

<sup>27</sup>Martin E. Malia, "Schiller and the Early Russian Left," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, IV, pp. 169--200, R. E. MacMaster, "In the Russian Manner," *loc. cit.*



were truly the "knights" of a crusading order that was to bring justice and freedom to Russia.<sup>28</sup> For similar reasons, too, their Westernism could never be absolute. Western ideas and scientific and philosophic achievements were not so many avenues to truth, as guides for action on the Russian political (and social) stage.<sup>29</sup> Complete Westerners, i.e. individuals who were interested in Western ideas for their scientific and philosophic or aesthetic truth value were either narrow professional scientists or very rare exceptions among the intelligentsia (B. Chicherin, P. Struve). Western ideas were transmuted into action-oriented eschatological programs.<sup>30</sup> Of all Western political notions, liberalism was the least adaptable to such a transformation, as it was in its very essence a negation of abstraction, eschatology, utopia. Liberalism could therefore hardly satisfy most of the members of the intelligentsia, and except for individual notions taken out of context, liberalism remained relatively unpopular and uninfluential during the formative period of Russia's ideologies.

True, the picture began to change after 1905 under the influence of the revolution and the disappearance of the worst aspects of autocracy, with the growth of an individualistic free enterprise economy, and the spiritual crisis of Russia's "silver age." But the forms of thought and the attitudes developed for more than a century by the best of Russian minds could not be discarded or changed overnight. They lingered on and hindered a gradual and harmonious evolution. Even more important in

<sup>28</sup>G. P. Fedotov, *Novyi grad - sbornik statei*, New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1952, p. 13. For the implications of these traits of modern "professional intelligentsias" in underdeveloped countries, see G. Fischer, *op. cit.* and Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," *World Politics*, XI-1, October 1958, pp. 1-19.

<sup>29</sup>P. Scheibert, *Von Bakunin zu Lenin - Geschichte der russischen revolutionären Ideologien 1840-1895*, Bd. I, Leiden, 1956, states this idea on p. 20 and develops it throughout his book. For our purposes the chapters dealing with the first expressions of nihilism and realism are most relevant.

<sup>30</sup>In spite of many exaggerations and all too sweeping generalizations one can find many interesting and informative facts and comments on this situation in E. Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients*, Tübingen, 1955, part I.

snuffing out whatever beginnings there were, was the outbreak of World War I. "Un beau mourir toute la vie embellit," and the beautiful and noble decline and death of the Russian intelligentsia and humanistic ideals after 1917 will serve, let us fervently hope, to redeem the errors and weaknesses of Russia's liberalism and its leaders. As an historic force liberalism had failed, but as a spiritual value it may yet have its rebirth.<sup>31</sup> This alone is more than adequate ground to study it with sympathy and understanding.

<sup>31</sup>Could Paternak's work not be a token of this hope?

# Muranovo -- "The House of Poets"

BY HELENE ISWOLSKY

WHILE Bolshevik leaders in 1917 attacked Russian cultural traditions, the Soviet government today is attempting, paradoxically enough, to restore this heritage. Besides the museums and archives of Moscow and Leningrad, there are in the U.S.S.R. today, a number of regional cultural centers and permanent exhibits established in old Russian country homes and estates. These are the so-called *Zapovedniki* (reserved areas) classified as national monuments, and special monographs and illustrated brochures are devoted to them. There are also popular "paper backs" describing the *Zapovedniki* and explaining their significance. One of these, brought out by the *Moskovskii Rabochii* (The Moscow Worker) in 1957, presents Muranovo, a country home in the Moscow area, known as the "House of Poets."<sup>1</sup>

Muranovo was the homestead of several prominent and highly cultured families of the nineteenth century. It was owned for some time by Eugene Boratynsky (famous in the pleiad of Russian poets) and later by the son of Fedor Tyutchev. That great poet often visited Muranovo, and his furniture, books, pictures, and papers were brought there by his son, Ivan Ivanovich Tyutchev. A grandson, Nikolai Ivanovich Tyutchev contributed to the preservation of this heritage and was later appointed curator of the museum.

Besides these two great names of Russian poetry, this typical *podmoskovnaya* (estate of the Moscow region) welcomed many other representatives of Russian literary circles. From Nicholas Gogol to the Aksakovs, most writers, literary critics, and dilettanti of belles lettres stopped at Muranovo on their way to or from Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>K. Pigarev, "Museums and Exhibits of Moscow Region" Series.

The guide book tells us that Muranovo annually attracts many visitors and therefore a detailed description of the museum was needed. This was done by N. I. Tyutchev, who died in 1949 at the age of seventy. Only he could have done this research work; not only did he write down the history of Muranovo, but he reconstructed, as "one of the family," the very scenes and atmosphere of this literary shrine.

The eighteenth and early nineteenth century Moscow "registers of the survey of lands" record Muranovo as an estate composed of plowlands, woods, fields, vegetable gardens, and orchards, river and pond fisheries, and of a village of some one hundred serfs. The estate also comprised the land-owner's house, his barns, cowsheds, and livestock. All this property, including the serfs and their homes, was acquired in 1816 by the wife of Major-General Leo Engelhardt, Ekaterina Petrovna, née Tatistchev, for the sum of 40,000 rubles.

General Engelhardt was a protégé of Prince Potemkin and a hero of the Suvorov campaigns. A profile of him was sketched by S. Aksakov in his *Family Chronicle*. Engelhardt was a handsome man of almost gigantic stature, always ready to tell about his war experiences. Aksakov as a small boy listened entranced to these stories, until the general alarmed him by wanting to enlist him in the army. When he first retired Engelhardt settled with his wife on his estates on the Volga, but life in those far-away lands was dull, and like most gentlewomen of her time, Mme. Engelhardt wanted to be nearer Moscow. So she bought Muranovo and moved to the *podmoskovnaya* estate with her family. Her husband did not mind the change since he could still keep two cannons in their park and fire them on the Tsar's feast day while once again donning his uniform and decorations.

The cannons were bequeathed by the General to another soldier, Denys Davydov, veteran of the war against Napoleon and famous leader of the guerrillas. Davydov was not only a hero but a popular poet, — brilliant, charming, and amusing — a friend of Pushkin, and an *enfant terrible*. He married Engelhardt's niece, S. Tchirikova, and often visited Muranovo. Thus came the first poet to the *podmoskovnaya* homestead.

Davydov also brought another poet, S. A. Boratynsky, who

was currently serving with the Russian army in Finland. Boratynsky was already well known at that time in Petersburg literary circles; his works were lauded by Pushkin and printed in the foremost literary journals. He was, moreover, associated with the leaders of the Decembrist movement and wrote a few "subversive" poems, one of them against Arakcheev's military tyranny. Thus he was *persona non grata* in Petersburg and Moscow society. Long before these political offenses occurred he was expelled from the *Corps des Pages* (the elite military school) for an infraction which was considered serious enough to bar his way to higher education. He was forced to serve as a private in the army until Davydov obtained a commission for him and later, an honorable discharge.

At Davydov's home, Boratynsky met General Engelhardt's daughter, Anastasia Lvovna, whom he married in 1826. After her father's death, Anastasia inherited his estate and the young couple settled there, where Boratynsky found both happiness and peace of mind. Though he remained until his death a melancholy and even somber poet, pledged to romantic solitude, his life at Muranovo was both pleasant and absorbing. He was interested in rural economy, cultivated his land carefully, and did some gardening and tree-planting himself. He was concerned with the fate of his serfs and mitigated their hardships as much as it was possible. Perhaps it was of Boratynsky's reforms that Pushkin was thinking, when describing Eugene Onegin's concessions to the peasants. Boratynsky was hopeful that the liberation of the serf would come "soon and peacefully," as he wrote in 1842. He wanted the peasant not only to be free, but also to be given his own piece of land. It is interesting that this *addenda* to the serfs' liberation as projected by Boratynsky, is mentioned in the Soviet guide book to Muranovo.

Family life also pleased and absorbed the poet, having become the father of three sons and four daughters. The house now proved too small so a new home was built — the Muranovo existing today. The windows of the new home opened on a familiar central Russian landscape: a pond, a flower garden, an avenue of birch trees, woods, fields, the church, and the village. The house was built of wood and brick and had a large hall

covered by a glass roof. There was a room where the children could study, with windows high in the walls so the young pupils could not gaze through them during their lessons. An underground passage connected the house with a nearby grove from which the serfs brought fire wood to feed the stoves and fireplaces. Thanks to the elaborate heating system, winters at Muranovo were cozy and cheerful. And there was the so-called "green-perspective" — a winter garden full of hot-house plants.

In spite of these comfortable surroundings, Anastasia fell sick. The doctors prescribed a milder climate so the couple left Muranovo in 1843 and went to Paris. Here Boratynsky met the most brilliant representatives of French literary and political circles: Alfred de Vigny, Lamartine, Prosper Mérimée, Sainte-Beuve, Thierry, Guizot. He also met the Russian residents belonging to the revolutionary group headed by Herzen and Ogarev. This could have marked a new period of life, new interests and aspirations, but Boratynsky could not remain in Paris. He journeyed to Livorno and during this sea voyage his melancholy seemed to have temporarily changed. This new mood is reflected by a beautiful poem in which he describes the waves of the stormy sea as inspiring him with vigor, almost "health," as he wrote. But could such "health" endure for long? They settled in Naples, where, for a short time, the poet enjoyed the enchantment of sea and sun. He wrote enthusiastic letters to his friends in Russia, and like all tourists in Italy, went sightseeing and sketched and painted. Anastasia improved, but her husband's health suddenly gave way and he died in June, 1844, in Naples. His widow returned alone to Russia.

The Muranovo estate was divided between Anastasia Boratynsky and her sister Sophy, who married Nikolai Vasilievich Putyata, well-known in Russian literary circles. Putyata, himself a gifted writer and essayist, was a man of high education and refined taste, to whom Pushkin read his poems, and who was on intimate terms with the Aksakov family. When he came to live at Muranovo, his many literary friends visited him there. Gogol was the first; then came Sergei Aksakov, with his fishing tackle. The author of the *Family Chronicle* was also an experienced angler who wrote a book on fishing. This visit was



followed by Putyata's establishing friendly relations with Aksakov's two sons, Constantine and Ivan, the Slavophile leaders.

In 1869, Putyata's only daughter, Olga, married Ivan Tyutchev, the son of the famous poet, Fedor Tyutchev, who spent many years abroad as a diplomat and had been twice married to Germans and had returned to Russia in the mid-forties. During the last fifteen years of his life the former diplomat was chairman of the Committee of Foreign Censorship in Petersburg. Though Tyutchev wrote his first poems in the days of Pushkin, (who paid him a fervent tribute) he did not attain literary fame before the eighteen fifties, nor did he seek public acclaim. He wrote with perfect mastery of style and content, completely unconcerned about when and how his poems would be published.

Because of his official duties, Tyutchev lived in Petersburg, but often came to Moscow. He had been Putyata's friend for many years, and when his son Ivan married Olga Putyata, he became very fond of his daughter-in-law and often visited them at Muranovo where they had settled. He came for the last time in the summer of 1871. Two years later he died at Tsarskoe Selo, near Petersburg, and was buried in the Novodevichi Monastery. His widow and son moved his belongings, including furniture, pictures and other objects of value to Muranovo, where the "Tyutchev Room" is one of the museum's main exhibits. His papers were for a time preserved at Muranovo, but all his unpublished material was later transferred to the Central State Archives of Literature and Art.

Tyutchev's daughter, Darya, married the Slavophile leader and writer, Ivan Aksakov, who also was the poet's first biographer. His memory is preserved at Muranovo in the "Aksakov Room" — a faithful reconstruction of his study, with his furniture and desk, a collection of Slavophile periodicals and photographs of Slavophile public meetings, and his favorite cookbook.

The most interesting room of the Muranovo museum is the main "study," where both Tyutchev's and Boratynsky's relics are placed side by side. Their two desks are there, with ink-stands, quill pens, globe-lamps and candles, a leather-bound

blotter, and a few opened letters. The breath of life still animates these objects; there is some dried ink on the quill pens, the candle-wicks are burned (Tyutchev lighted them for the last time, the guide book tells us). One of the envelopes bears the postmark 1873. The windows open on the quiet park and its shaded avenue. The light gently filters through half drawn curtains. Boratynsky liked this semi-darkness for his creative work. His death-mask dominates the scene. It was made by a Russian painter who was living in Naples at the time of the poet's death. The painter was Alexander Ivanov, whose picture, "Christ Appearing to the People," had a profound influence on Russian religious thought.

The Muranovo museum presents a pageant of Russian life and literature. It tells us the story of great poets and humble cabinet makers, of masters and servants, children and old men. It also tells the story of Russian women, devoted daughters, wives and mothers, from Boratynsky's Anastasia who brought to the poet's soul at least a temporary peace, to Tyutchev's Darya, his favorite daughter. We are happy to feel that Soviet youth can learn something about those poets. For us too, the little guide-book offers the opportunity of an enchanting excursion into the past, which it so vividly re-creates.

## Book Reviews

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *Socialism In One Country 1924-1926*. N. Y., Macmillan, 1958. 557 pp. \$7.50.

The mid-twenties were a relatively calm and peaceful interlude in Soviet history. The revolutionary storm had abated. The ruling Communist group had scrapped the unworkable methods of war Communism and had built some bridges of compromise and conciliation to the non-Communist intelligentsia and to the peasants. As compared with the years of revolution and civil war, which went before, and the years of "purges," "liquidations," hunger, and mass deportations that followed the Soviet citizen in this time of the New Economic Policy, or NEP, was leading a stable and fairly comfortable life.

However, as Mr. Carr shows very well in this fifth volume of his chronicle of revolutionary Russia, the NEP brought to the Communist masters of the country some difficult dilemmas and deep-seated contradictions. These revolved largely around agrarian policy and the author displays a proper sense of proportion by devoting the longest section in the book to what was happening in the Russian village in these years and what repercussions this caused in Moscow.

Perhaps the biggest dilemma may be summarized as follows: The Soviet Government desperately needed at this time an ever larger output of foodstuffs from the peasants, to feed the cities which were reviving and filling up after the blight of hunger, cold, and neglect

which descended on them during the first years of the Revolution and to exchange abroad for essential imports. But it could only obtain this increase by favoring the so-called kulaks, the richer, more efficient, more enterprising peasants, — the very class which the Communists considered politically most undesirable and potentially hostile.

The poorer peasants, beloved of the Communist agitator, were no help; they seldom raised enough for their own needs. Even the *seredniak*, the "middle" peasant, usually ran a subsistence farm with a small surplus for the market.

It was only the "strong" and "sober" peasant, in whom Stolypin placed his faith when he started, too late unfortunately, with the break-up of the primitive peasant community which was a brake on agricultural progress, who could raise enough for a large marketable surplus. Had the Communist leaders stuck to the self-imposed restraints of the NEP, notably the re-establishment of a market economy, had they given the "kulak" free economic rein, including the all-important right to buy land, Russian economic recovery would have proceeded along very different lines.

Some influential figures in the Kremlin favored this policy of appealing to the peasant instinct for private property. So Bukharin called on the peasants to "enrich themselves" and Commissar of Finance Sokolnikov strongly opposed measures which threatened to throw the budget out of balance and to force the development of

industry by swindling the peasants by setting high prices for industrial goods and low prices for agricultural products.

But in the end, and the unfolding of this sequel may furnish Mr. Carr with material for further volumes, an infinitely more ruthless and more risky course was decided on. There was a virtual restoration of serfdom by imposing on the peasants the generally hated collective farms, where they lost all the bargaining power they possessed as small proprietors and were compelled to work as the state-landlord directed and on the state-landlord's terms.

The book is well based on scholarly research; the author has obviously ploughed through vast quantities of Soviet magazines and newspapers and reports of Communist Party Congresses. The period of the NEP has not yet received any very thorough treatment and Mr. Carr must be congratulated on breaking new ground and making more comprehensible the turn to forced collectivization and rapid industrialization in 1928-29.

There is interesting material on such dimly remembered episodes in émigré intellectual life as the *smena vekh* and the effort of Professor Ustryalov to identify the NEP with the Thermidorean period of the French Revolution. Unfortunately the imaginative professor proved wrong in his long range estimate.

There are also interesting personal evaluations. Bukharin emerges as one of the most sympathetic, or least unsympathetic, of the Bolshevik leaders; he is almost the only one in whom the use of the word "love," toward Lenin, does not strike an incongruous note. Mr. Carr sees in Stalin two outstanding traits, an anti-European and anti-

intellectual bias and a tendency to think in terms of Soviet national interest and to brush aside fine points of scholastic discussion. Perhaps Lenin was more incisive when he singled out as Stalin's two characteristic qualities "rudeness" and "disloyalty," which can easily be equated with cruelty and treachery.

This excellent historical work might have been still better if Mr. Carr had lived in the Soviet Union during the years which he describes. It is unlikely that any traveler in the Soviet villages would have carried away the impression that the kulaks were exactly the petted children of the Soviet local administrators. And anyone who was a resident of Moscow or Leningrad in 1925 would have probably added as a footnote to the ceremonial celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Academy of Science that the OGPU chose this occasion to carry out a secret slaughter of a number of graduates of a famous pre-war Russian lycée, on no better grounds than a foolish speech delivered by an émigré in Paris.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN  
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FAINSOD, MERLE. *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*. Harvard University Press, 1958. 484 pp. \$8.50.

*Smolensk under Soviet Rule* constitutes the happy result of the meeting of distinguished scholarship with unique source material. The book is a delight for specialists on Soviet history and politics and because it is so skillfully composed and so well written even the serious general reader could well find it absorbing. Professor Fainsod ap-

plied to the Smolensk Archives, the only collection of Soviet Communist Party internal communications ever made available to non-Soviet scholarship, the techniques of analysis and organization which made his *How Russia Is Ruled* a basic aid in the study of Soviet political institutions.

After tracing the geographic and historical background of the Smolensk area, Professor Fainsod treated the rich, although in many ways fragmentary, data at his disposal from two main points of view. In the section of the study entitled "The Pattern of Controls" there is a fascinating analysis of the structure and functions of the Smolensk Oblast Party organization, its subordinate levels of jurisdiction, and of the organs of state administration controlled by it or coordinate with it in authority. A particularly interesting part of this section of the book is Chapter eight, dealing with the organs of state security. Impressive documentation demonstrates the degree to which even the mighty Party chiefs of the Smolensk area stood in awe of the secret police, which was, as Professor Fainsod points out, Stalin's instrument for controlling the party itself. On the other hand, the section on party-police relationship also indicates how insecure, potentially, was the situation of even police officials.

The largest section of the book, entitled "The Impact of Authority," demonstrates the complex pattern of interaction between the Moscow-dominated totalitarian machine and all of the major phases of life in the Smolensk area, which was, during most of the period treated, much larger than the present Smolensk oblast. Perhaps of greatest interest in this treasure-trove of material is the extraordinarily revealing

chapter on the inner workings of Soviet censorship.

The story told so well in this book is a grim one. At the same time, however, it is also a very human one. It is a story of "little lords and great lords," of scoundrels and idealists, and, above all, of the usually but not always hopeless struggle of individuals to achieve their own purposes in an unequal combat against a relentless administrative machine. While the study adds new dimensions to our understanding of the power of totalitarianism, it also adds to our realization of the weaknesses, failures, poverty, and misery concealed by the totalitarian facade. Doubtless many of Professor Fainsod's findings have retained much relevance even for post-Stalin Russia.

FREDERICK BARGHOORN  
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FISHER, RALPH T. JR. *Pattern for Soviet Youth: A study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-54.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. 452 pp. \$6.75.

Today, the Komsomol or the Communist Youth League, is a mass organization embracing about one third of the Soviet age groups 14-27 provided they are eligible for admission. It serves both as an instrument of indoctrination of the younger generation and as an auxiliary to the Party.

This organization is the subject of an interesting study by Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr. as part of the research program of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. The author presents the Komsomol through the looking glass of its

congresses or national conventions of which, at the time of the completion of the study, 1955, there had been twelve and one more has taken place since. This procedure has the disadvantage of concentrating attention on the early history of the organization when conventions were frequent: there were nine from 1918 to 1931, and only three since. The author is fully aware of this handicap and, for the later period, especially for the gap between the Tenth Congress in 1936 and the Eleventh Congress in 1949, uses supplementary material excerpted mainly from the organization's daily paper. But the formative years of an organization are frequently decisive for later development. The Komsomol presents no exception: the proceedings and resolutions of later congresses read as elaborations of things already many times said.

The author has entitled his book *Pattern for Soviet Youth*. If one expects to find a systematic discussion of rules of conduct to be followed by an ideal Soviet youth, he will be frustrated, because of that there is but little. In his conclusion, the author summarizes them as follows: "loyalty to the Party chiefs, iron discipline, self-sacrificing bravery, ideological purity, incessant vigilance, uncompromising militancy, and hatred toward enemies." These are generalities which are not specifically Communistic. This is not the author's fault: the Communist Party which controls the Komsomol as strictly as any other organization in the Soviet Union has never succeeded in giving flesh and blood to the portrait of an Ideal Soviet Man. Obviously, an auxiliary organization would not dare going farther than the boss.

But the author has done some-

thing different. Through the Komsomol he has surveyed an enormous amount of facts which have constituted Russian history since 1918. He was almost compelled to do so because the Komsomol had to take care of all the acute problems which, one after another, have preoccupied the ruling group. The dynamic perspective chosen by the author throws full light on the process of the gradual absorption, by the Party, of every evidence of initiative emerging in the texture of Soviet society. In the beginning, the Komsomol leaders believed that they could play an almost independent role but they were soon rebuked and prohibited from playing the part of "the vanguard of the vanguard," the latter being the Party. The general contempt of legality characteristic of Communist leadership has been many times displayed, especially as to periodical convocation of the congresses and to the election and revocation of Komsomol functionaries. One of Fisher's findings is especially interesting: from the rank of first auxiliary to the Party, the Komsomol has gradually been downgraded to one of the lowest ranks; today, it counts less even than school authorities.

Fisher is extremely modest in his claims. He hopes that his study will be followed by further investigations which would answer the question: "what does it really mean to unite 18 million into one organization?" But he himself has already given the answer: the Komsomol is just one of the instruments used by the dictatorial regime, not more and not less.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

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MEYER, ALFRED G. *Leninism*. Russian Research Center Studies No. 26, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957. 324 pp. \$5.50.

In view of the importance attached in the Soviet Union and throughout the Communist world to Communist theory and to Leninism since its very inception, it is perhaps surprising that the number of books published on Leninism in particular and Communist theory in general in English and other languages, especially since 1945, has not been actually larger. Among those published during the last decade, Meyer's brief analytical study of Leninism stands out as a significant contribution to the understanding of Lenin's thought. Meyer has written a well-documented, penetrating, and thoughtful book, and has succeeded in compressing into approximately three pages a great deal of basic information and a large number of well-chosen quotations from Lenin's works. While on the whole limiting himself to exposition, he has not refrained from taking a definite position on most relevant questions. The present study does not claim to be either exhaustive — it rather stresses the "grand outlines" of Leninism — or definitive.

Since Stalin's death and his posthumous relegation to a place of lesser importance, Leninism, the study of Lenin's thought and reference to his writings, has gained even more in the U. S. S. R., and the authority of his Writ is greater than ever. His dynamic energy, policies, and his thought, complex as it is, are plainly written over the face of the Soviet Union. The mind of Soviet Russia cannot be read without an attempt to read the mind of

Lenin.

In view of the extreme flexibility of Leninism and its tendency to serve as justification for the most diverse and even opposite policies, the question of the relevancy of its study must be faced. The author is fully aware that Communist leaders may justify "almost any policy" by reference to Lenin. Nevertheless, the importance of theory for Lenin — and for post-Leninist Communism — cannot be denied, though it is admitted that many a theory of Lenin was nothing but a "rationalization" of one or the other policy decision. Considering that Lenin was a man of political action, it remains, the author holds, a puzzling phenomenon that he preoccupied himself so seriously and consistently with the writings of Marxism and dialectics. There remains little doubt of the vast influence of his thought on later Communist generations, and every Communist leader to some degree does let "Lenin do some of his thinking for him."

The author holds it impossible to define Leninism since there were "in reality several Lenins," an optimistic and comparatively soft one and one who had become pessimistic and hard, "one who believed in democracy and the one who instituted centralism; the internationalist and the Soviet patriot; the political realist and the man who thundered against opportunism, the gradualist . . . and the advocate of permanent revolution." Also, Lenin, even simultaneously, pursued different goals. It is equally difficult, if not impossible, to define Stalinism since it, too, comprised varied patterns of thought and many diverse policies. All that may be done is to focus attention on some characteristic features and tendencies of Leninism and list its broad goals

and Lenin's set of rules for attaining them.

It is to be expected that in a work of this scope there are points of disagreement, of different emphasis and interpretation. Meyer notes correctly that from certain points of view the adequacy of Leninism as social science, considering especially its actual hold on millions of people, is irrelevant. Yet after pointing out how many inadequacies, exaggerations and half-truths it embraces, he still speaks of the "major contribution" of Leninism to social science. He also asserts in the preface that "a knowledge of nineteenth-century Russian social thought is not one of the essential preconditions for an understanding of Leninism," but later points repeatedly to the links between Lenin and the preceding Russian revolutionary movement and reaches the conclusion that Leninism is "a merger of Marxism and earlier Russian thought." In view of this judgment, at least some discussion of the influence of the earlier Russian thought on Lenin might have been included.

In the West few doubt the inherently totalitarian character of Leninism. The author seems to share this view when, considering Lenin's conception of the Communist Party as the general staff of the world revolution, he sees therein his "most conspicuous contribution to twentieth century politics." Since other modern totalitarian parties have been patterned after this model, Lenin is looked upon as a "pioneer of the totalitarianism of our age." However, when summing up, Meyer sees only a totalitarian "trend" in Leninism, holding that "Leninist writings have managed to keep democratic traditions if not alive then at least in print." This is held

to provide "the vista of an alternative," the alternative of democracy. There were always, Meyer asserts, Leninists who retained faith in ultimate democracy under socialism and Communism. Democracy, if ever revived in Communist countries will be revived "in the name of Leninism."

Revival of democracy in Communist countries appears unlikely. Should it ever take place "in the name of Leninism," it will be little justified in view of Lenin's ambiguous attitude to democracy. His favorable comments on democracy are often buried among his critical remarks. Political democracy had for Lenin primarily an instrumental value, being dependent on its usefulness to the coming proletarian revolution. True, Meyer expresses the opinion that the "promise of direct democracy" in a later stage, the classless society, forms part of the Marxist "as well as of the Leninist tradition," without, however, elaborating this important point.

These remarks are not intended to obscure the real merits of a study which should prove an excellent critical introduction to Leninism, and one which may be read with great benefit by the advanced student as well. There can be little doubt as to the vital importance of Leninism for an understanding of twentieth-century Russia and of Communism at large. And it is to be hoped that the author, who in this brief study has shown unusual perception and the ability to treat a complex subject with exemplary clarity, will see fit to add further to our understanding of the thought of one of the most influential men of the twentieth century.

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JELAVICH, CHARLES. *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*. Berkeley University of California Press, 1958. 304 pp. \$4.50.

The subject of this penetrating monograph is Russian policy in the Balkans after the Congress of Berlin, with special reference to two Slavic nations, Bulgaria and Serbia. The years covered are 1879 to 1886, a comparatively short period but one which really required a careful and dispassionate investigation.

It was generally assumed that Bulgaria, reduced in size by the Congress, would exist in the Russian sphere of influence and the great powers were ready to acquiesce in this settlement of Bulgarian national aspirations. No objections were raised to the election to the Bulgarian throne of Alexander of Battenberg who was related to the Tsar and had the support of both the Vienna and Berlin courts. Russian advisers assisted the Bulgarians in setting up a constitutional regime, and Russian officers remained in the country to train the Bulgarian army. Ostensibly, all major decisions tended to cement and perpetuate friendly relations between the nascent Slavic principality in the Balkans and the Russian Empire.

In five chapters of his book (II-VI) Professor Jelavich sketches Bulgarian developments from 1879 to 1885 and points out the blocks on which the original settlement eventually foundered. Apart from emotional forces and personal animosities four major problems caused mutual dissatisfaction and estrangement of the new nation from its liberator and protector.

As a constitutional system the semi-independent principality had a rather difficult and depressing

start. As Professor Jelavich aptly shows nothing but frictions could arise from the incongruous role which the Russian autocracy was destined to play amidst ideological conflicts and party struggles among the inexperienced but enthusiastic Bulgarians. While there was some hope of a compromise in the Russo-Bulgarian controversy over the railroads, the size and organization of the Bulgarian army was a thorny problem in which both the Prince and the leaders of Bulgarian parties were involved. Controlled by the Russians, the army not only could be used for re-inforcement of Russian troops in case of a new war with Turkey but also as a tool in determining the course of Bulgarian politics. Professor Jelavich thoroughly examines this knotty point and sheds ample light on its many facets. Finally, a good deal of critical thought was given to the Prince and his precarious position in relation both to local leaders and Russian advisers. On his attitude toward the latter depended, of course, his relationship to the Russian government and to the Tsar himself.

Two chapters of the story (VII-VIII), devoted primarily to Serbia under Milan Obrenovic, call the reader's attention to unexpected gains which Russia acquired in that country without too much effort or preliminary planning. Austrian interventions in Serbia, no more disturbing than Russian meddling with Bulgarian affairs, enhanced the Tsar's prestige among the Orthodox Serbians, a prelude to complete re-orientation of Serbian foreign policy in the early twentieth century.

Late in the summer of 1885 the center of gravity shifted once more to Bulgaria, and the union of Bul-

garia with Rumelia eclipsed other unsettled issues. In two brilliantly written chapters (IX-X) Professor Jelavich presents both the triumph of Bulgarian nationalism and the dismal collapse of Russian policy in regard to Bulgaria, inaugurated under favorable auspices after the Berlin congress.

Not designed for popular consumption and wide circulation Professor Jelavich's succinct study will find appreciative readers among students of modern European history. Selecting the Bulgarian case as an instructive example, the author shows convincingly how difficult it was to harmonize the idea of Slavic and Orthodox solidarity, propagated by the Slavophiles, with concrete problems facing the builders of independent Bulgaria. His search for the seeds of discord in a highly sensitive area has been rewarding. The book, though deliberately limited in its scope, possesses broad aspects and wide ramifications. It is remarkably free of emotionalism and has enriched our knowledge both of Balkan affairs and of the intricacies of Tsarist policy in that region.

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

University of Pennsylvania

CHARQUES, RICHARD. *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*. Fair Lawn, N. J., Essential Books, 1959. 256 pp. \$6.00.

MOORHEAD, ALAN. *The Russian Revolution*. N. Y., Harper and Brothers, 1958. 301 pp. \$5.00.

The author of *The Twilight of Imperial Russia* is a journalist born in England of Russian parents. In 1956 he published what is probably the best one-volume history of Rus-

sia, now available in a Dutton Paperback edition.

The present volume is a skillful popularization of the reign of Nicholas II, from 1894 to his abdication and the collapse of the Monarchy in February-March, 1917. An epilogue deals briefly with the period from February to October 1917.

The author wishes to emphasize three main points: 1) the Bolsheviks contributed little or nothing to the February revolution; 2) due to the personal equation of the key figures and the contending parties, the period is full of "ifs" and hypothetical questions; 3) the errors and confusion of the Russian liberals were largely responsible for the triumph of the Bolsheviks. On this last point the author observes that Russian liberalism of the Miliukov variety which aimed at complete parliamentary democracy was probably "inviting defeat," but before and during the First Duma the liberal leaders in effect acted more like revolutionaries than moderate reformers: "As such they were easily outbidden in the course of events by those of more extreme purpose, whose dialectical distinction between a bourgeois and a proletarian revolution they had all too blindly accepted."

Mr. Charques is familiar with the basic source material, including the recently published (in Russian) memoirs of Miliukov and Chernov. His evaluations of the leading personalities and events (except possibly for Stolypin and the agrarian reform) are, on the whole, objective and fair-minded. It is a lucid, informative summary of the decline and fall of the Russian monarchy.

Unlike Mr. Charques' book, Mr. Moorhead's *The Russian Revolution* produces an impression of the author's rather limited knowledge

of Russian history and culture. The Australian journalist and author of the brilliant *Gallipoli* makes, in fact, his first excursion into the Russian field. The purpose, stated in his preface, "is to provide for the general readers as dispassionately and as objectively as possible, a description of a great political upheaval which is still too recent for history . . ." Undoubtedly the author made a sincere effort at objectivity, but the results fall somewhat short of the promise. There are quite a few omissions and oversimplifications as well as some distortions and factual misstatements. To mention a few: the treatment of the reforms of 1860-70 is completely inadequate — the important judicial reform is not even mentioned (p. 12ff); his thesis of the inevitability of the revolution is not too convincing (p. 31) and the treatment of the years 1907-1914 is much too sketchy (pp. 63-76); not all narodniks were revolutionaries (p. 32); Sukhomlinov's treason has never been proven (p. 95); Basil Maklakov and Purishkevich did not belong to the same "party" (p. 107). The main trouble is that the author relied too much on Trotsky, Sukhanov, and foreign accounts and that, having no knowledge of Russian, was unable to consult many important Russian works and memoirs published since the revolution.

The author's main effort is to show that "the Germans played an important role in bringing Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power." This part of the book is based on the records of the German Foreign Office which were investigated by Professor S. Possony of Georgetown University with the financial assistance of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and the editors of *Life*

magazine. The chapter dealing with the German stake in the revolution ("The German revolutionary net") is a useful summary of pertinent data. It was subsequently confirmed by the collection of documents of the German Foreign Office edited by Z. A. B. Zeman, *Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918*, Oxford University Press, 1958. It is hoped that the publication of this new data on German-Bolshevik relations will help to reopen the whole question of the controversial "Sisson documents."

Mr. Charques' and Mr. Moorhead's volumes are well-written, profusely illustrated, and should be of interest to the general reader and to some extent to the student of Russian history as well.

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WEIDLE, WLADIMIR. *Zadacha Rossii*. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1956, 231 pp. \$2.25.

Wladimir Weidlé, the eminent Russian art critic, social philosopher, and professor at the Paris Orthodox Theological Institute, became known to the English-speaking world through the translation of his study *La Russie présente et absente* (*Russia: Absent and Present*, N. Y., London, 1952) a slender volume, but fraught with highly stimulating, pertinent reflections on Russia's social, political, and cultural destinies. Whereas *La Russie présente et absente* was designed to help Westerners attain a better understanding of Russia and the Russian mentality, *Zadacha Rossii* (*The Task of Russia*) is meant rather for the Russian reader, but with the same purpose. For the



Russian emigré, particularly of the younger generation, as well as the Soviet citizen of Russian birth stand in dire need of being sympathetically instructed in the historical individuality of Russia; if the legacy of a great historical achievement is not entirely to be forfeited, they must learn more about her traditions, so often violently cut off or lying dormant under the rocks and rubble of recent social and political transformations.

Therefore, the first four chapters deal with the central problem of Russian history and historical thought: the relationship between Russia and the West, the West being the entire non-Russian (and non-Byzantine) Europe, and, of course, America. It cannot be this reviewer's task to expound the extraordinary wealth in ideas, all soundly documented and substantiated, which are contained in the thoughtful reflections upon the borders of Europe, Russia and the West, the three historical formations of the Russian state and society, and finally the "Russian Soul." But it must be pointed out that Weidlé tries, on the whole successfully, to bridge the gulf between the romantic traditionalist Slavophiles and the Westernizers and their successors and intellectual heirs by stressing the fact that Russia despite many peculiarities of development, conditioned by geography and history, still shares the same basic legacy with the rest of Europe — the culture of classical antiquity and Biblical religion.

Thus, the whole long and exacerbated debate between the two factions is rendered rather meaningless in that modernism in Western terms, so passionately advocated by the radical intelligentsia, is just as well part and parcel of the Euro-

pean mind as the religious folk culture defended by the traditionalists against the dreaded infusion of Western "corruption" in the Russian national mind. May it be added that even today, in her almost hopeless estrangement from the West — an estrangement deeper than even the most extremist Slavophile would have dreamed — she yet remains, perhaps more than ever, a child of Europe in having fallen prey to metaphysical and revolutionary materialism and utopian titanism, one of the great heresies of the West.

Pushkin, Russia's most national and at the same time most "European" poet, and Tiutchev, the poet and patriot with Slavophile sympathies, in his ambiguous attitude to his homeland and native tongue, furnish apt illustrations for Weidlé's contention that in Russia's most outstanding minds Russianism and Europeanism are inseparably, if sometimes precariously, interlocked.

The last essay dealing with prophecies and forebodings of the decline of Peter's capital sheds light upon a paradox of Russian history: at the very moment when the country was about to let her destinies be guided by one of the West's most radical ideologies she turned her back to the former capital that had expressly been designed to be Russia's window to the West.

No serious student of Russian life, letters, and thought can afford to bypass this valuable book.

HEINRICH STAMMLER  
*Northwestern University*



MAZOUR, ANATOLE G. *Modern Russian Historiography*. Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1958. 260 pp. \$6.50.

A score of years ago Professor Mazour set himself the extremely difficult task of summarizing for the novice the development of Russian historiography. In the present volume he has added more detail, particularly in the earlier portion, and has attempted also to bring his work up to date. To his extensive bibliography he has added five books (four of them Soviet publications) and five articles.

A major problem was and is that of setting limits to his treatment: one possibility was to confine himself to historical writing by Russians; an alternative was to include only studies of Russian history. The author has accepted both limitations and restricts his account to writers in Russia about Russia; exception is made only for brief reference to a few works by recent émigré scholars and for incidental mention of a handful of recent studies by Americans. This frame of reference necessarily omits altogether a very considerable body of work, some of it of superlative value, written by American, British, and continental students of Russian history. It omits also much first-rate work done by Russian scholars on aspects of history not directly related to Russia.

The problem of organization in a presentation of this kind also offers major difficulties. Professor Mazour's solution is to deal separately with individual historians, loosely grouped into three periods "eighteenth century," "nineteenth century," "second half of nineteenth century." From the last of these he now isolates two categories:

one of these he calls the "federal school," to which he assigns Siberian and Ukrainian scholars, together with an assortment of "other historians of the period," including the "legal" Marxists; his remaining separate category is entitled "Marxist historians," under which heading appear also "émigré Historians" and "the Eurasian school." This arrangement is obviously accidental, reflecting the uneven expansion of his earlier *Outline*; it is occasioned by interpolation at various points of names of historians previously omitted, as well as by addition of twenty-five pages (some 10% of the total) on the vicissitudes of historical writing in Russia since the original date of publication.

Professor Mazour's method entails supplying some interesting facts about each writer's personal background and professional career, together with more or less extended analysis of his work and appraisal of its significance. It is a method which works best with his treatment of eighteenth-century *Geschichtssammler*, the classification he accepts for Tatishchev, Bayer, Müller, Lomonosov, Shcherbatov, Boltin, and Golikov, and of Schlözer, the first *Geschichtsforscher* in Russia. The method is less satisfactory when the author deals with nineteenth-century *Geschichtsschreiber*, beginning with Karamzin and his critics, Polevoi and Pogodin, continuing through the confused period of the Slavophil-Westerner debates and the rise of the Historical Juridical School (from which Professor Mazour distinguishes Solovyev), to culminate in the great *Geschichtsmaler*, V. O. Kluchevsky. For these and their successors into the twentieth century, including Platonov, Milukov,

his favorite Semeysky, and a number of others, it might have been helpful to sketch more clearly the changing intellectual climate which affected them as individuals and to have given more attention to the reasons for the rise of "schools" of history.

The weakest portion of this study is that devoted to the Soviet period. Here, except for the inevitable Pokrovsky, the author mentions individuals — even Grekov — only in passing. Instead of the work of historians Professor Mazour here discusses the changing directives under which scholars are expected to operate. No one will deny that official policy has tended to raise the percentage of jackals in the

service of Russia's Clio (such writers have been known to flourish also in other times and climes). Yet Russian historical scholarship, though driven to resort to many subterfuges, has not been totally extinguished. A selective discussion of significant work of value would not have been out of place.

What Professor Mazour does offer is an outline useful for the beginner in Russian studies, clearly and carefully presented (and with few typographical errors); this book is of exceptionally high value in fulfilling its avowed purpose.

JESSE D. CLARKSON  
*Brooklyn College*

## Book Notices

GROSS, FELIKS. *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions*. Philosophical Library, 1958. 398 pp. \$6.00.

When opening this book, one expects to find in it a substantial advance over Curzio Malaparte's *Coup d'Etat: the Technique of Revolution* (1932). Unfortunately the book is definitely inferior to its brilliant predecessor.

The purpose of the study is formulated in the Introduction as follows: "The focus of our study is on how power is seized and on how an autocratic or democratic government is overthrown." In Part One, the author defines such basic concepts as power, the instruments of power and revolution, and offers a typology of revolutions. He distinguishes four types: revolution from the top, revolution from the bottom, combined seizure, and the palace revolution. Then he announces that the volume will be a kind of case study of the Russian revolutionary movement since, in it, all four types of revolution have been embodied.

The presentation is neither original, nor very clear. It is amazing that S. M. Melgunov's *March Days* (published in the Russian magazine *Vozrozhdenie*) and *How the Bolsheviks Seized Power* have not been used; they give much more insight than the sources used by the author. The book has many mistakes, misrepresentations, and has been poorly edited.

N.S.T.

KOSLOW, JULES. *The Kremlin. Eight Centuries of Tyranny and Terror*. N. Y., Thomas Nelson, 1958. 244 pp. \$5.00.

Using the Kremlin as a focal point, the author has written a sketch of Russian history adorned with a variety of anecdotes, some verified, some dubious. He has thus provided a colorful account of the Muscovite rulers and their struggles against Mongols and other enemies. The most spectacular tsars were Ivan the Terrible, a monster of cruelty, and Peter the Great, whose brutalities, loutish conduct, and unconventional marriage make for racy reading. As Peter moved the seat of government to St. Petersburg, however, thereafter the Kremlin figured little in Russian life. In 1812 it saw the Napoleonic occupation and the burning of Moscow, after which it again stagnated. The author has sought to make up for lack of historical events by giving a detailed account of the Kremlin's architectural development and many drawings and photographs. Finally, after describing the storming of the Kremlin by Red troops in November, 1917, he practically ends his chronicle, offering little or nothing on the resounding events of the last four decades in which the Kremlin has figured.

This volume should have considerable interest for the general reader. For the serious student of Russian history, however, it will probably have little value.

J.S.C.

LAIRD, ROY D. *Collective Farming in Russia. A Political Study of Soviet Kolkhozy*. Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas Publications, Social Science Studies, 1958. 176 pp. \$2.50.

In some respects, agriculture is one of the neglected areas of Soviet studies (although the economists have produced numerous excellent articles and two important longer studies of the Soviet agricultural system: Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* and Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Agriculture*). A notable exception in this respect is Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant*. As a result, few contemporary Western students of Soviet politics indicate acceptance of the repeatedly emphasized Soviet assertion that the two long-run goals of Soviet agricultural policy, the efficient industrialization of production and the transformation of the peasantry into a rural proletariat, are on the verge of realization.

This study attempts to explore the political side of this phenomenon. The central plan is to trace simultaneously the formulation and development of Bolshevik agricultural theory and policy and the erection and evolution of the actual political structures which have been created in the name of fulfilling the asserted policies.

Laird presents the thesis that the 1917 Revolution marked a point in history when the Bolshevik revolution joined forces with the Russian agrarian revolution which had had its beginning several decades earlier and without which the Bolshevik Revolution could never have borne fruit. The joining of the two revolutionary movements was ended with the decision by Stalin to re-

make rural Russia in the image of the Bolshevik revolution. Laird then analyzes the employment of the political forces unleashed in what has been termed by Soviet leadership as the agricultural "revolution from above."

Rich in erudition and bibliography, Laird's is an exemplary contribution to this important sector of Soviet economy.

J.S.R.

OVERSTREET, HARRY AND BONARO. *What We Must Know About Communism*. N. Y., Norton, 1958. 348 pp. \$3.95.

This is a cool, lucid exposition of the nature, objectives, and methods of Communism and is to be heartily welcomed. The Overstreets leave no doubt in the mind of any attentive reader that the "grand design" of Communism is the subversion, by force or preferably by intrigues and propaganda, of every non-Communist society in the world, from the leftwing socialist to the conservative. One of their most effective quotations is one from Lenin in 1920 to the effect that wherever mutual animosities exist between non-Communist groups and nations it is the Communist Party's task "to take advantage of this hostility and to incite one against the other."

Stalin may have deviated from some of Lenin's commandments but his guileful, crafty nature made him an expert disciple in carrying out his injunction to foment discord. And Khrushchev is an apt pupil of Lenin and of Stalin. Some of the best passages in the book show with chapter and verse how Communists are always at work, seeking to set group against group,

race against race, nation against nation. Why no negotiations or agreements, "summit" or otherwise, are likely to lead to more than an uneasy truce in the cold war is clearly explained in the following sentences:

"The signing of a treaty across the division line prescribed by the Marxist-Leninist version of the class struggle is an act of expediency. The breaking of it is also precisely that — and nothing more."

W.H.C.

WALSH, WARREN B. (Ed.) *Readings in Russian History*. Third revised edition. Syracuse University Press, 1959. 702 pp. \$7.50.

The third edition of this familiar anthology has been considerably

revised and much enlarged. There have been some excisions, but most of the original material has been retained, and over thirty new items have been added. The sections dealing with the twentieth century have been entirely re-arranged, and the final section is devoted wholly to the Soviet period. The "Suggestions for Readings" have been completely revised to include recent publications. The emphasis on primary source materials has been retained, and so have the criteria of selection: interest, importance, and lack of ready availability in most libraries. Each selection is preceded by an editorial note which identifies the source and describes the general setting which the selection illustrates.

## Letters to The Editor

Dear Sir:

Since the publication of my review of the English version of Mikhail Zetlin's book *The Decembrists* in the January 1959 issue of your periodical it has been brought to my attention that my review might be considered not entirely fair to the late Mr. Zetlin because it lists mistakes in the English version which are not present in the Russian version (Mikh. Zetlin, *Dekabristy. Sudba odnogo pokoleniya*) without noting this point. I have also been assured that Mr. Zetlin, who died several years ago, is in no way responsible for the deviations of the English version from the Russian. I might mention here that the English version which I was given to review, while different from the Russian in content and organization, nowhere accounts for this difference, nor does it explain who is responsible for it. While the checking of the English version against the Russian is an unprofitable task (for instance, I found a certain error in the English version present in the Russian, but, the content of the English paragraph in question came from two different places in the Russian version, separated by many pages) and an unnecessary one for the English reader, I am glad to point out that Mr. Zetlin himself is not responsible for the following mistakes noted in my review and present only in the English version of the book: the making of Alexander Turgenev the father, and of Nicholas Turgenev an uncle, of the great novelist Ivan Turgenev, and the appointment of Alexander Muraviev as governor of Novgorod instead of Nizhnii Novgorod. The English version even develops the thoughts of the characters in the narrative, including those which are ascribed to Miloradovich as he faced the insurgents, and to which I had occasion to refer in my review. As a separate point, Mr. Zetlin makes no mistake in sending Paul Kiselev as Russian representative in Paris. Both brothers Kiselev, Nicholas and Paul, served in that capacity; as you knew, I mentioned the need to make this correction in my text



twice earlier, the first time early in December long before the appearance of the review.

In conclusion may I repeat the obvious: it was my task to review the English version of Mr. Zetlin's book on the Decembrists.

Respectfully,  
NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

Berkeley, California  
April 9, 1959

. . . . .

Dear Sir:

In the April, 1959 issue of *The Russian Review* there appeared a review of my book *Early Soviet Writers* by Professor Gleb Struve. This was his second review of my book, an earlier one having been published in the weekly *The New Leader*, January 19, 1959.

In my previous rebuttal to Professor Struve's criticism in *The New Leader* on February 23, 1959, I indicated that I considered his review for the most part inaccurate and hardly objective. I feel I must reiterate this statement in regard to his review in your journal. Here are the reasons:

1. Professor Struve states that the major deficiency of my book is the omission of studies of Konstantin Fedin, Aleksei Tolstoy, Nikolai Nikitin, Edouard Bagritsky, Ilya Ehrenburg, Mikhail Sholokhov, and Boris Pasternak. My work in relation to the history of Soviet literature is divided into two parts: "Early Soviet Writers" and "Recent Soviet Writers." This second book, which is a separate volume of a two-part study, has been written but not yet published, and in it I have covered the characteristics of the seven writers mentioned by Professor Struve.

In my reply to Professor Struve in *The New Leader* of February 23, I indicated in detail the reasons for the division of my work into two parts.

2. Contrary to Professor Struve's opinion, I do not consider Alexander Grin "insignificant," but, rather, a foremost writer. I also am aware that my personal opinion is not sufficiently

authoritative for the Western reader; therefore, I have given the judgement of Yury Olesha, who is convinced that Grin is as important as Edgar Allen Poe, and also the opinion of Vsevolod Rozdestvensky, who considers Grin to be of no less stature than Herman Melville.

3. In considering both of my books together, rather than separately as Professor Struve did, the inclusion of material on secondary and even lesser writers is not without value, and is helpful to the reader. For instance, it is true that I went into some detail on the works of the prose writer Panteleymon Romanov and the poet Vasili Kasin. The reason for that was that without Kasin, it is difficult to explain the poetry of Zabolotsky, Kornilov, and Vasilyev who are covered in separate chapters in my second book, *Recent Soviet Writers*. Also, without Romanov, it is impossible to explain the trend of Soviet literature during the past three decades which shows the decline of socialist realism and the rise of traditional critical realism.

4. There are two points of view in regard to N. Gumilyov's poem, "Worker." Some (among them Professor Struve and the Soviet literary specialist, Volkov) see in this poem a real German munitions worker, while others picture a symbolic revolutionary, exemplifying violence and terror. Nikolai Tikhonov (and earlier, Alexander Malyshkin) rebelled against the first point of view, finding in it "naturalistic oversimplification of the theme of foresight in Gumilyov's poetry." Personally, I am in agreement with the second opinion, which Professor Struve declares to be a gross factual error.

Professor Struve has the right to agree or disagree with this or that opinion; but those opinions with which he doesn't agree certainly cannot be considered as major or minor *factual* errors in the book.

VYACHESLAV ZAVALISHIN

New York  
May 13, 1959

Dear Sir:

In view of the fact that at the end of his letter of rebuttal Mr. Zavalishin recognizes my "right to agree or disagree with this or that opinion," his objections to my review seem to me rather pointless. I shall nevertheless try to answer his four points briefly.

1 & 3. I can only repeat in substance what I said in my reply to Mr. Zavalishin's letter in *The New Leader*: I was reviewing his book in the form in which it was published, not reading his mind. In the absence of all indication in the book that it was part of a longer work I was naturally struck by the absence of some important names. But even in the light of his explanation I think he was arbitrary and inconsistent in including some writers among the "early" ones and excluding some of the others.

2 & 4. Our disagreement over Alexander Grin is a matter of opinion. There is here, as in some other cases mentioned in his letter, a question of an error of judgement (I use this formula in my review), not of a factual error. As for the meaning of Gumilyov's poem "The Worker," I am fully aware that Mr. Zavalishin's interpretation is not only his own. I regard it as erroneous and based on a careless reading of the poem (of which I was myself guilty once upon a time). But Mr. Zavalishin should at least have mentioned the possibility of a different interpretation and discussed the possible dating of the poem (most, if not all, of the poems in *Kostyor* were written before the Bolshevik Revolution).

I should like to note, in conclusion, that most of Mr. Zavalishin's grievances refer to matters of opinion, while most of my references to his factual errors remain unanswered. I may add that those errors do not seem to me very important; they are venial sins, easily forgivable and redeemable. For my part, I welcomed (and still welcome) those reviews of my book on Soviet literature (there were not many of them) which pointed out my factual mistakes, fully realizing that there were bound to be many of them. My adverse opinion of Mr. Zavalishin's

book is based not on such errors of fact, but on what I consider some major faults in its general design and structure.

Yours faithfully,  
GLEB STRUVE

*Berkeley, California*  
May 21, 1959

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#### ERRATA

In Professor George Gibian's review of Ivan Turgenev's *Literary Reminiscences* which appeared in the April, 1959 issue of *The Russian Review*, in the sentence reading: "Wilson avoids jargon, pedantry, biographical criticism," a line of manuscript was omitted. The sentence should read: "Wilson avoids jargon, pedantry, and all hobby-horses, and the various pitfalls of psychological and biographical criticism."

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